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ETHNICITY AND INTERESTS AT THE 1990 
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
Glenn Petersen• 
Political relations within the Federated S tates of Micronesia (FSM) are 
strained not only by the FSM's ambiguous (and tenuous) relationship with the 
United States but by the heterogeneity of the peoples who make up its 
population. In July 1990 the FSM undertook a Constitutional Convention 
(ConCon) intended to confront and perhaps resolve some of the stresses 
Micronesians saw accumulating.1 At the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional 
Convention, which drafted the FSM's original constitution, the dynamics had 
in large measure turned on the question of political status: the Convention was 
charged with drafting a constitution for an entity whose future political status 
remained entirely indeterminate. Relations among the various regions within 
this polity would in turn be contingent upon the outcome of negotiations that 
were still far from complete. The problems the 1990 ConCon faced were, on 
the other hand, rooted in matters more specifically concerned with internal 
relations, both between the several states and their national government and 
among the states themselves . These internal affairs were of course contingent 
upon still evolving relations with the United States. 
* This account of the 1 990 FSM Constitutional Convention is based almost entirely on 
my own verbatim notes, and notes taken by my assistant, Eve Pinsker. I was 
graciously permitted to attend all committee meetings and plenary sessions. An 
official Journal has never appeared and I have thus been precluded from compar­
ing my transcriptions of the plenary meetings with the revised transcripts of the 
ConCon stenographers. All the quotations I use, unless otherwise specified, are 
from my own notes. 
During the course of my research the delegates and staff of the Constitutional 
Convention were without exception cordial and cooperative. If at times I could not 
obtain information I sought, I was not alone; all who participated patiently endured 
[cont'd next p.] 
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When the 1990 ConCon began its proceedings, the delegates seemed 
prepared to implement sweeping changes in the very nature of the FSM' s 
political structure. But by the time the people had finally voted in the 1991 
referendum called to ratify the few changes the ConCon actually achieved, the 
FSM '  s national government was left virtually untouched. What had begun as a 
concerted attempt to reshape the Micronesian regime concluded as no more than 
an exercise in regime maintenance. Given that a majority of Micronesians 
appeared to agree that their government was in desperate need of significant, if 
not radical, changes, the question of why so little was ultimately accomplished 
is a pertinent one. The answer lies in the character of relations among the states; 
despite agreeing upon what was wrong with the national government, the state 
delegations could not agree upon which changes would bring about the needed 
reforms. This lack of agreement sprang from competing notions of what the 
modified government should look like. Though Micronesians are largely 
unhappy with what they have, they are not at all sure what they would like to 
replace it with. This discord is rooted, most immediately, in ethnic differences 
among (as well as within) the FSM's four states . 
the multiple confusions and recurring power outages that are a fundamental part of 
life in modem Micronesia. In particular I wish to thank the following individuals 
for their assistance: ConCon president, Resio Moses; standing committee chairs, 
Sabino Asor, Leo Falcam, Bethwel Henry, Camillo Noket, Robert Ruecho' and 
Martin Yinug; ConCon administrator, Ihlen Joseph; Asterio Takesy, head of the 
Pre-Convention Committee; ConCon staff attorneys, Cyprian Manmaw, Brian 
Tamanaha, John Brackett, Gary Yamaguchi, and Mike Powell; ConCon secretary, 
Shintaro Ezra; and Pohnpei Delegation legal counsel, Thomas Tete. I also 
benefitted greatly from various sorts of help and advice from Joan King of JK Re­
port; Professor Norman Meller; and FSM chief justice, Edward King. Eve Pinsker 
rendered me invaluable research assistance. The people of Awak and peliensapw 
Otoi provided my family and me with affectionate hospitality, as they have unfail­
ingly done for years. My wife, Victoria Garcia Petersen, and daughter, Grace, put 
up with my nearly continual absence as I worked to complete several research 
projects simultaneously, and shared with me their many thoughtful insights. The 
Faculty Research Award Program of the City University of New York (PSC­
CUNY) provided the funding that made this project possible. 
On the occasion of his retirement from teaching, I wish to dedicate this paper to my 
friend and colleague, Professor Eugene Ogan, who has taught me so much about 
doing social science responsive to the realities of Pacific island lives. 
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Ethnic relations within the FSM 
The Federated States of Micronesia comprises four states, Yap, Chuuk (for­
merly Truk), Pohnpei (formerly Ponape), and Kosrae (formerly Kusaie), all 
part of what are known to cartographers as the Caroline Islands. With the 
exception of Kosrae, each of these states includes both a volcanic main island 
(in Chuuk's case, a cluster of volcanic islands within Chuuk Lagoon) and a 
number of scattered coral atolls. According to the 1990 census, the FSM' s 
total population is 106,231. The populations of the individual states are as 
follows: Chuuk 54,796; Pohnpei 33,263; Yap 10,782; Kosrae 7,390. 
In certain significant ways, the FSM more close! y resembles the Melanesian 
nation-states than it does most of Micronesia. Bel au (Palau), the Marshalls, and 
Kiribati are self-consciously homogeneous in their ethnic composition; each is 
defined as much by the shared culture of its people as it is by its geography. 2 The 
FSM, on the other hand, is something of a residual category, including as it does 
all the islands remaining in the old Pacific Island Trusteeship after the US had 
negotiated separate agreements with the groups where it sought military basing 
arrangements.3 It is, as a consequence, very much a multi-ethnic country. 
Distinct languages are spoken on each of the larger islands (Kosrae, 
Pohnpei, Chuuk, and Yap), in the area known as the Woleai (the atolls between 
Chuuk and Yap), and on Nukuoru and Kapingmarangi (two Polynesian outliers 
south of Pohnpei); there are those who would argue that some of the other atoll­
dwellers speak distinct languages as well. Moreover, those who in the world 
political arena refer to themselves as 'Micronesians' would be the first to 
acknowledge that 'Micronesia', however defined, is a colonial construct; within 
the islands they are inclined to speak of themselves as members of specific 
communities rather than as citizens of FSM states or the FSM as a whole (if 
indeed they define themselves at all). 
Political tensions, cleavages, and alliances within the FSM are largely 
rooted in sectional, rather than class, oppositions. Having passed from au­
tonomy through four different colonial regimes and back again to limited 
autonomy in less than a century, the FSMhas experienced too many compelling 
changes in economic and social policies for any group to have established itself 
as an upper, ruling, or dominant class. And though most of these societies 
continue to organize themselves around chiefs and chiefly lineages, in addition 
to the electoral and bureaucratic systems introduced since World War II, the 
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small size of the political units, the highly fluid nature of local social status, and 
the varying, frequently contradictory, impacts of the sequential colonial re­
gimes have all promoted a marked degree of social mobility. With the possible 
exception of Yap, traditional social stratification was hardly of a degree that 
might be usefully termed 'class', and recent emphases on public education and 
government employment have worked to keep any group from entrenching 
itself in positions of power. 
Sectional differences within the FSM are, in tum, primarily ethnic. This is 
not to deny diversity grounded in local ecology and geography, political and 
economic histories, and other material factors. But the Caroline Islands have 
been settled for at least two thousand years (Yap may have been settled for 
considerably longer) and although there has been a good deal of interaction 
among the island peoples, the societies and cultures of each have developed 
essentially in situ for two millennia.4 During this epoch the dynamics of eco­
logical adaptation, history, and social relations have produced distinct cultures 
on most of the islands. The islanders are consciousness of these cultural 
differences, and in their interactions with one another employ and understand 
them in ways that are, in comparative terms, usefully termed 'ethnic'. 
More salient, however, is the self-consciously limiting character of political 
groups in the region; these polities tend not to be expansionist. People in these 
islands are inclined to think of themselves in terms of their respective political 
communities. At the heart of what it means to be Pohnpeian, for instance, is a 
sense that political centralization is morally wrong. Paramount chiefdoms have 
largely-though by no means entirely-been ritual in nature and have seldom 
include more than two or three thousand people. Local chiefdoms - which 
serve as sites of most political mobilization - rarely include more than two 
hundred people. As a Pohnpeian chief once remarked to me, 'One man cannot 
rule a thousand' (Petersen 1982). Lingenfelter (1975:99-159) has made similar 
arguments concerning decentralization in traditional Yapese polities, and 
Chuuk Lagoon has long been known for the political fragmentation of its island 
communities. In their interactions with each other, then, the people of the FSM 
tend to focus on the differences that separate them. The greater the distances that 
separate peoples, in an island world where most interactions came only as 
products of very deliberate sailing voyages, the greater the ethnic differences 
between them. 
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These ethnic differences, moreover, translate themselves immediately into 
political differences. While the people of Yap island, for example, jealously 
defend their communal liberties as they jockey for position among themselves, 
they nonetheless recognize that they share certain values concerning the nature 
of such manreuvering for position. This in turn means they can reasonably 
assume that those with whom they compete locally are no more inclined than 
they are themselves to pursue power beyond socially acceptable limits.5 They 
view the peoples of other islands and regions with considerably less equanimity, 
however, since they can only marginally be expected to share common values. 
Out of this context grows a general insistence, within the FSM, on the 
sovereignty of the FSM states. By and large the FSM' s peoples are loathe to 
allow 'Micronesians' to rule them. 'Micronesia' is a colonial construct and 
'Micronesians' are in many ways as alien as any of their former colonial rulers, 
serving as constant reminders that the colonial era is not entirely past. At the core 
of the tensions that beset the FSM, then, are these ethnic fears of centralization. 
Unity within the FSM remains a tenuous matter, and the best testament to this 
is the use of the phrase 'Unity' as a talisman; it appears everywhere. Unity is 
invoked precisely because so many people are frankly dubious about it. 
When the delegates to the 1990 Constitutional Convention gathered, they 
spoke in English, the Micronesian lingua franc a. In doing so, they were forced 
to recognize that they were dealing with a government that was neither Kosraen 
nor Chuukese, Pohnpeian nor Yapese, that is, that was not their own. Those with 
whom they did speak in their own languages were their fellow delegation 
members. Thus the very structure of the ConCon enhanced the delegates' 
awareness of the differences among them. They found themselves in opposition 
not only to their national government- that is, the entity called 'Micronesia' 
- but to the other delegations as well. In coming together, these men found 
themselves readily agreeing upon their opposition to the national government. 
But they were able to accomplish very little in the way of changing the 
government they so disliked because the very process of working together to 
transform it required of them awareness of the ways in which they differed from 
those with whom they were working. In the end, the Con Con was reduced to near 
impotence: though everyone agreed that major changes in the FSM' s govern­
ment were needed, no one could agree on what the changes should be. 
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The impasse grew out of fears that were in fact partly structural (that is, 
grounded in differences in populaticn sizes and related issues) but were phrased 
in terms of ethnicity. While the Yapese and Pohnpeian delegations steadfastly 
sought to protect their own autonomy and to enhance their rights to place their 
own customs above the powers of the central government, both the Kosraens 
and the Chuukese saw themselves threatened at least as much by the others as 
by the central government. 
Sece�ion and sovereignty as issues 
Most delegates seemed to agree with a colleague who commented, as 104 
proposed amendments gradually accumulated, 'We're not amending the Con­
stitution; we're writing a new one'. In the end, the ConCon approved twenty­
four amendments, the majority of them quite minor, and in the referendum 
that followed the voters approved only four of these. It certainly appears that 
little came of the effort. It would be easy to conclude from this that whatever 
tensions do exist in the FSM are minor and of little historical consequence. 
One has only to look at Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at the end of the 
1980s, however, to realize that appearances do not necessarily provide an 
accurate guide to looming political cleavages. I cannot assert that the FSM is 
on the brink of a collapse such as that seen in the old Soviet bloc, but I do 
believe that the 1990 ConCon' s inability to effect any major changes will 
exacerbate longstanding problems within the FSM and that the country is 
certainly edging closer to a breaking point. 
For this reason I want to draw particular attention to Pohnpei' s proposal for 
constitutionally sanctioned secession. The Pohnpeians have made no secret of 
their interest in the possibility of seceding from the federation. Although the 
ConCon quickly rejected their proposal, the possibility that Pohnpei might 
secede, when placed in its historical context, sheds considerable light on the 
question of state sovereignty, one of the issues most visibly animating the 
ConCon. Most of the proposals that came before the ConCon had similar sorts 
of historical antecedents -that is, they derived from political questions raised 
by the Enlightenment, the framing of the American constitution, and American 
influence on the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional Convention (Petersen 1990) 
- and a brief exploration of this single case might serve as an example of how 
larger history impinged on the 1990 ConCon. 
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Pohnpei's delegation accomplished virtually none of the many projects it 
introduced to the ConCon, and the prospect of secession continues to waft about 
the island like the clouds local mythology says once obscured it from the view 
of outsiders. If and when Pohnpeians move to leave the federation in the pursuit 
of genuine independence, Chuuk' s leaders are likely to pursue a closer relation­
ship with the US. Without the buffering influence of Pohnpei, Kosraens' fears 
of Chuukese domination will prompt them to turn away from the federation, too. 
The Yapese, left to their own devices, will probably opt to follow the Pohnpeian 
lead and seek their own independence. The origins of this potential cleavage can 
be traced to historical processes that patched the Micronesian trusteeship 
together in the first place, and to the ambiguities of the first Constitutional 
Convention, which sought to assign to the new national government enough 
power to negotiate Micronesia's political status with the US. As a consequence, 
it created a government powerful enough to eventually alienate the states that 
constitute it. At the 1990 ConCon, Micronesians had an opportunity to relieve 
some of the accumulating strains. The fact that they did not is perhaps a sign that 
the strains had already grown too strong. 
Though the proposed amendment permitting secession played a seemingly 
marginal role in the ConCon' s deliberations (if one were able to study an official 
Journal the only reference to secession one would encounter would be the 
introduction of Delegate Proposal 88 which contains this amendment), it is 
instructive to consider its import for questions of Micronesian unity and 
sectionalism. 6 Given the FSM 's historical ties to the US and its constitution, and 
the entire question of the FSM' s sovereignty, this issue is particularly trouble­
some to the people of Pohnpei. When the secession proposal was briefly taken 
up in committee, the FSM's acting secretary of External Affairs (who was a 
ConCon delegate) opposed it on the grounds that it would make the FSM appear 
unstable and therefore drive away potential investors. Moreover, he continued, 
the US government would be inclined to view such a measure as a threat to the 
FSM's security agreements with the US under the Compact o f  Free Associa­
tion, and if it were enacted he would immediately be called in by the US for 
consultations and instructions.Atthispoint one of the ConCon's most influential 
delegates, former FSM president Tosiwo Nakayama asked, 'Why do we need 
this in the Constitution?'. A Pohnpeian delegate replied, 'Our people asked for 
it'. Nakayama responded, 'In other words, there are people here in Pohnpei who 
would like to secede?'. Came the reply, 'All of them'. 
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The possibility of secession had been quickly dispatched at the 1975 
Micronesian Constitutional Convention. The original convention met in S aipan 
at a time when the Marianas had just voted in favour of a separate Common­
wealth agreement with the US, the Marshalls were partially boycotting the 
ConCon in their quest for separate status negotiations, and the Belauans were 
seriously threatening to begin their own talks with the US. The Committee on 
General Provisions submitted a committee proposal (No. 27) explicitly prohib­
iting secession. Though the final draft of the 1975 constitution contains no such 
clause, the committee report remains in the permanent record, where it stresses 
that in sending delegates to the Con Con and ratifying the constitution a state 'has 
made a firm commitment to join' theFSM. It argued that the constitution should 
'not allow a later reassessment of this commitment which may be motivated by 
a change in the economic or political conditions within a State'. The report went 
on to insist that the new federation's ability to engage in international relations 
would be harmed if states had the option to secede (Standing Committee Report 
No. 40). 
This emphatic opposition to secession is perhaps best understood in the light 
of American history, which guided both the delegates and their American 
advisors and counsellors. From the earliest days of the republic, sectionalism 
had played an important role in American politics. Much of the opposition to the 
relatively strong central government outlined in the constitution was phrased in 
terms we would now call ethnic (Storing 1985), and certain key arguments in the 
Federalist Papers were grounded in Madison's belief that sectionalism was a 
threat that must be overcome. Less than ten years after ratification the Kentucky 
and Virginia Resolutions (the former drafted by Thomas Jefferson) of 1798-99 
argued that the indi victual states had been sovereign before the constitution was 
ratified, that they retained this sovereignty under the constitution, and that they 
therefore possessed the right to 'nullify' federal acts they deemed unconstitu­
tional. Later, when a group of New England states opposed the War of 1812 and 
seriously considered seceding from the Union, then in 1832, when South 
Carolina nullified an unfavourable tariff structure and threatened to secede, and 
again in an 1850 slavery dispute, the earlier Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions 
on nullification were used in support of the claim that sovereignty was still 
vested in the states. It was not until the Union prevailed in a great civil war that 
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the questions of state sovereignty and secession were ultimately decided in 
favour of irreversible union. Members of the original Micronesian Constitu­
tional Convention, guided by the outcome of this history, had thus opposed any 
possibility of secession. 
But the 1990 FSM ConCon can only be understood in terms of struggles 
over the question of state sovereignty; there were claims made that the states 
existed prior to the federal government. This linked the legal status of the FSM 
states to the existence of the people inhabiting them - an inherently ethnic 
argument. 7 Therefore, some said, any questions about relations among the states 
could only be resolved on the basis of full equality among them. An advisor to 
the Kosraen delegation, alluding to the fact that Chuuk state includes more than 
half of the FSM population, remarked privately that 'When the Chuukese say 
something should be done 'democratically ' ,  they mean that Chuuk should have 
the power'. This comment both echoes John Calhoun' s  claim- made in the 
course of the nullification controversy- that true democracy is not the rule of 
an absolute or numerical majority, and his proposal that decisions be made by 
'concurrent' majority, with the people of each state having a veto over federal 
legislation. 
The opening battle of the 1990 ConCon was fought over the question of 
whether each state would have the right to veto proposed constitutional 
amendments via a requirement for 'consensus', that is, the agreement of all four 
state delegations. Kosrae insisted upon this rule and in doing so argued from a 
position explicitly grounded in the logic of state sovereignty. An extension of 
this logic might have led it to support Pohnpei' s  quest for a secession amend­
ment. But, as we shall see, the overwhelming fear of American interference was 
enough to terminate discussion of any proposal that might involve the US in 
FSM affairs through the security treaties annexed to the Compact (see below). 
And, ironically, it was recognition of precisely this residual American power in 
Micronesia that motivated the Pohnpeians ' continued call for true indepen­
dence and theirright to secede from the federation. While each of the FS M states 
was experiencing its own individual frustrations, they were all - without 
entirely recognizing the commonality of their experience - chafing at the 
continuing obstacles confronting them as a consequence of their ambiguous 
political status. 
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Historical background 
Micronesian constitutionalism cannot be studied without reference to the 
extreme ambivalence- not to mention confusion- the US has demonstrated 
in its administration of the Pacific Islands Trust Territory (as well as its other 
dependencies). The US seriously considered annexing the islands in the years 
after, and at the outset of negotiations with the Micronesians in the late 1960s 
the US sought to impose a political relationship that was, according to in­
formed accounts, no more than a copy of Guam's Organic Act with 'Guam' 
blotted out and 'Micronesia' inscribed. Though the US invested vast sums of 
money trying to persuade Micronesians to accept a relationship that would 
perpetuate American suzerainty in fact if not in name, it was not as successful 
as some have imagined. In the sixty years preceding the end of the Pacific 
War, Micronesians experienced transitions from precolonial autonomy 
through the rise and fall of three other colonial regimes (Spain, Germany, 
Japan). Differing local outlooks provoked reasonable scepticism, and for 
every argument put forward in favour of close, permanent ties with the US, 
there were equal and opposite arguments insisting on political distance from 
it. 
As the US began to comprehend that it was making no headway in its 
attempts to fully dominate the region, it gradually modified its strategy and 
began exploiting geographical, cultural, and historical differences that had 
previously been impeding its progress. Acknowledging a certain degree of pre­
existing antipathy among the island groups and attempting subtly to augment it, 
the US worked to counteract more visible movements toward unity among 
them. 
The most articulate seat of resistance to American rule in the area was the 
first pan-Micronesian legislative body, the Congress of Micronesia (COM). 
Almost immediately after it began meeting in 1965, the COM undertook 
negotiations aimed at ending US. trusteeship in the islands. In the course of ten 
years' hard work preceding the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional Convention, 
its representatives had convinced their opposite numbers in the US administra­
tion that the great majority of Micronesians did not want to be - or to become 
- Americans. They had not, however, made much progress in deciding upon 
just what status they were willing to settle for. One of the reasons for holding the 
convention was the hope that in coming together to consider the character of 
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future self-government, Micronesia's leaders would also sort out what that 
government's relationship to the US might be. The convention did in fact serve 
as a catalyst: preparations for it set into irreversible motion a series of separatist 
movements within the Trust Territory. While their historical trajectories are 
distinct, the separate political status negotiations of Bel au, the N orthem Marianas, 
and the Marshalls all gathered momentum or culminated in the months preced­
ing the Constitutional Convention. 
The 1975 Constitutional Convention 
By 12 July 1975, when the original convention first convened, the only thing 
even remotely certain about the Trust Territory's future status was that it 
would not remain a single political entity. The US had fostered a plebiscite on 
a 'Covenant' in what was then the Marianas District of the Trust Territory. In 
a vote held on 17 June, less than a month before the convention got underway, 
70 per cent of the voters approved a new arrangement intended simulta­
neously to cleave the Marianas off from the rest of the Trust Territory and to 
integrate them permanently into the US as a Commonwealth (a somewhat 
unspecific status patterned on that of Puerto Rico's relationship with the US). 
Because the convention met on Saipan, the principal island of the Marianas, 
the delegates had to work in surroundings dominated by the remains of a very 
visible campaign that had opposed precisely the union they were charged with 
crafting (Meller 1985:74-82). 
The Marianas plebiscite, and particularly its timing, were widely viewed as 
part of a deliberate ploy to weaken the Micronesians' solidarity. During this 
same period the US had also attempted to initiate discussions concerning 
American control over local lands with the Trust Territory's individual districts. 
Moreover, the US was engaged in wiretapping some of Micronesia's political 
status representatives and the State Department was hoping to exert covert 
influence on the Constitutional Convention's outcome (Petersen 1986). This 
array of American intrusions further antagonized a great many Micronesians. 
Their sentiments were manifest when they went to the polls a few days before 
the Constitutional Convention opened, to vote in a 'Referendum on Future 
Political Status' (in reality, an opinioo poll). Though the confusing ballot format 
precluded any clear outcome, in the districts that eventually became the FSM 
(Pohnpei [which at that time included what is now Kosrae State], Chuuk, and 
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Yap) the total number of votes in favour of the 'Independence' option substan­
tially surpassed those for the alternative future political status options: 'State­
hood', 'Commonwealth', 'Free Association' (which had not yet been fully 
defined), and continued 'Trust Territory' status (Petersen 1975).8 
In recent years the meaning of this vote has been misunderstood and 
misrepresented. It is worth reconsidering. The ballots listed each status option 
followed by boxes inscribed 'yes' and 'no'. Voters were able to express their 
support for or opposition to each option. In Pohnpei, however, where I was able 
to see the completed ballots, most voters simply voted 'yes' for the status they 
pref erred and ignored the remainder of the ballot. Many voters in other regions 
did the same. For this reason, I have long maintained, it is inappropriate and 
misleading to read significance into the 'no' tally. The only meaningful results 
are the 'yes' votes: independence received in excess of one third more votes than 
did free association. Despite this apparently clear mandate for 'independence', 
a number ofFS M leaders and expatriate advisers have long claimed that because 
'independence' received more 'no' votes than 'free association', the latter status 
was the one the people charged them with pursuing. In doing so, they misrep­
resent the message sent by the voters in 1975 (Petersen 1975, 1979, 1985). On 
the other hand, voters in the Marshalls and Belau districts overwhelmingly 
rejected 'independence' and instead voted for continued 'trust territory' status 
by a substantial margin. The Belauan and Marshallese votes mirrored widespread 
sentiments in those two districts-lying at the outer edges of the Trust Territory 
- against any further union with the rest of Micronesia. Though Belauan and 
Marshallese delegates participated in the Constitutional Convention, it was 
clear from the outset that their hearts were not in it, and Norman Meller (1985) 
has described the irony of a situation in which the Belauans played a leading role 
in shaping the convention's agenda even as they were inexorably pulling away 
from what was to become the Federated States of Micronesia. 
The first Micronesian constitution was written under conditions that are 
best described as tenuous. In the face of actions on the part of the US that were 
reasonably perceived by the Micronesians as hostile to an effective Micronesian 
autonomy, and the realization that the Marianas, the Marshalls, and Belau were 
about to pursue separate accords with the US, the constitution finally agreed 
upon was drafted with at least as much concern for gainsaying US political 
interference in the region as with clear-sighted visions of how best to fashion a 
system of self-government for the peoples of Micronesia. 
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The dual task- to deal simultaneously with external pressures and internal 
relations - generated two conflicting strategies. One was to design a strong 
central government with relatively weak states, the second to create strong states 
with a relatively weak central government. The purpose of the former was to 
ensure that the new Micronesian government would be potent enough to defend 
national interests. The alternative was meant to prevent the national government 
from being strong enough to serve as an effective proxy for American interfer­
ence in local affairs. These two apparently contradictory programmes were 
intended, then, to achieve essentially the same goal: to limit continued US 
dominance over Micronesia's affairs. The outcome was, finally, a compromise; 
no clear-cut decision was made about the inherent strengths and weaknesses of 
the future Micronesian government (Meller 1985). But there was general 
agreement that the new government would be responsible for ending the 
trusteeship. That is, whatever type of government evolved, its task was to ensure 
that negotiations with the US remained on course, pursuing a high degree of 
autonomy and self-government. 9 
The new republic and free association 
To an extent, the delegates succeeded in achieving this basic goal. The 
national government of what in 1979 became the Federated States of 
Micronesia (following a 1978 constitutional referendum) doggedly negotiated 
a Compact of Free Association with the US, and the Compact was approved 
by three of the four FSM States in 1983 (Pohnpeians opposed the Compact, 
steadfastly calling for independence, but have for the present also been willing 
to comply with the majority's decision). Congressional approval in the US 
took considerably longer, but was eventually secured. In 1986 the US declared 
an end to the Micronesian Trusteeship (with the exception of Belau, which has 
yet to approve a compact with the US), and in 1990 the United Nations 
Security Council voted to confirm this transition. 10 
This free association agreement is more than a little vague. Despite its being 
purposely negotiated as an alternative to independence, some Micronesian 
leaders (particularly the Pohnpeians) now claim that the FSM is indeed an 
independent nation-state, am the United Nations admitted the FSM (along with 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Baltic states) as a member in 1991. 
And while the FSM's constitution claims that nothing may compromise its 
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authority within the FSM, the Compact of Free Association carries with it 
annexes which grant the US rights to interfere in internal Micronesian matters 
if 'security' is at stake. Moreover, the US Congress ratified the Compact with 
the stipulation that the US has the right to declare literally anything a 'security' 
matter, thereby assuring the US right to interfere legally with any internal 
Micronesian issues it chooses to make its concern. During the course of the 1990 
ConCon, several of these matters surfaced as major, unresolved issues of 
contention, particularly for the Pohnpeian delegation, which continued to 
pursue its people's quest for genuine independence. 
Official self-government in the FSM began in 1979. Bureaucratic functions 
were gradually transferred from Trust Territory headquarters on Saipan to 
newly established offices and agencies in the national capital on Pohnpei (and 
to the new Belauan and Marshallese governments in Koror and Majuro). At the 
time of the 1990 ConCon, then, the FSM had been self-governing for eleven 
years, even though its political status had still not been entirely resolved. Indeed, 
the political status of the FS M (and the Marshalls) remains ambiguous, despite 
UN approval of the free association relationship and the end of trusteeship. 
While scholars generally hold that these polities are not genuinely independent 
and that their sovereignties are compromised by the Compact (Firth 1989; Smith 
1991 :94-100), some politically and legally interested parties are inclined to 
view them as entirely sovereign and/or effectively independent (Michal 1992; 
Stovall 1991). FSM leaders, as we shall see, express divided and sometimes 
ambivalent opinions about the exact nature of their country's political status. 
The original FSM constitution requires that the voters be asked, every ten 
years, if a constitutional convention should be called. In the general elections of 
March 1989 the ConCon item appeared on the ballot, and a majority of the 
voters in Yap, Chuuk, and Pohnpei indicated that they would indeed like to have 
one convened. After Congress scheduled the ConCon, drafted its rules, and 
allocated funds for it, each state elected delegates in proportion to its congressional 
representation, plus two 'traditional leaders' or 'chiefs'. 
The ambiguous nature of both the FSM' s relationship with the US and its 
international status added to the discontent delegates brought with them to the 
ConCon. As a consequence of a host of financial, security, and related arrange­
ments, many Micronesians believe that the US retains undue influence over 
their national government. This applies not only to the American government, 
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but also to the Merrill Lynch investment firm, which managed a bond issue that 
enabled the FSM to use the Compact of Free Association's fifteen-year pay­
ment guarantees to gain more convenient access to funds. Merrill Lynch, some 
argue, has exercised unwarranted (or at least unexpected) influence over FSM 
financial decision-making, despite the broker's claims to the contrary. General 
discontent with the power of the FSM Congress, and the way that Congress 
exercises it, was bolstered by a sense that the central government served at least 
as much to channel American authority as to challenge it. In seeking to curb 
congressional powers, a substantial number of delegates (and the people who 
elected them) were hoping not merely to shift authority from the central 
government to the states, but to minimize the degree of authority the US wields 
over their islands. When one of the highest-ranking FSM government bureaucrats 
serving as a ConCon delegate asserted that the states no longer needed 'two 
drivers', he was speaking not only of power sharing between the state and 
national levels, but also about the contest between the FSM and the US. 
The fundamental questions facing the delegates, then, had not only to do 
with their country's internal political life, but with its external relations. Each 
decision had to be analyzed as a possible reorganization of links among the 
states, between the states and the national government, between the FSM and the 
US, between the states and the US, between the national government and foreign 
powers, and between the states and foreign powers. The manifold ramifications 
of each and every potential change made accord that much more difficult for the 
delegates to achieve. Although there was remarkable agreement about the need 
for changes in relationships between the states and the central government, there 
was little agreement on the sorts of changes that should be effected in relations 
among the states themselves. 
Despite a shared sense that the national government too often served to 
channel American influence, the very vagueness of the FSM' s relationship with 
the US also made delegates hesitate to weaken what was still their main bulwark 
against the US. Any change in the national government might potentially curtail 
its ability to withstand American interference. In the absence of clear-cut 
agreement on how to shape internal changes, few delegates were actually 
willing to risk weakening the national government's ability to deal with the US. 
Nor were they eager to tamper with the central government's role in securing 
foreign aid from sources other than the US. The delegates had to decide both 
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how much power to allow to the national government and how much to transfer 
to the several states. 
The latter question lies at the core of this essay. Though the delegates largely 
agreed that they were charged with shifting power from the centre to the states, 
and shared doubts about how much power to strip from the centre, they were 
entirely at odds about what sort of, and how much, power to give the states. 
States, delegations and interests 
States and delegations 
Delegates representing the four FSM states came to the ConCon with decid­
edly differing styles and points of view. The delegations from the two smallest 
states, Kosrae (with four delegates) and Yap (with five), were marked by a 
relatively high degree of internal cohesion. The two larger delegations, Chuuk 
(with thirteen members) and Pohnpei (with nine), only occasionally achieved 
unanimity in their deliberations and voting. Kosrae had a clear-cut mandate 
and the Chuuk delegates seemed fairly certain about where their state's 
interests lay, but the charges borne by the Yapese and Pohnpeian delegations 
were either unspecific, as in Yap' s case, or somewhat contradictory, as in 
Pohnpei's. 
Kosrae's position was straightforward. The state's leaders had opposed the 
convention, and when it was convened, they attempted to diminish its effective­
ness by arguing strenuously for adoption of rules requiring agreement -
'consensus' -of all four state delegations before approving any amendment to 
the constitution. As representatives of the smallest and most homogeneous FSM 
state, Kosrae' s delegation took the position that any reorganization or redivision 
of power or funding was likely to threaten the principle of state sovereignty­
that is, each state's share be equal to that of each of the others. Kosrae's Yosiwo 
George, one of two state governors serving as delegates to the ConCon (the other 
was Resio Moses of Pohnpei), was a particularly determined and articulate 
spokesman for this position. 
Chuuk's delegation represented a diametrically opposed tendency within 
the federation. The population of Chuuk State, according to new census figures 
first made available during a ConCon hearing (and then only unofficially), is 
greater than that of the other three states combined. The people of ChuukLagoon · 
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have long been split into eastern and western factions (the latter has consistently 
pursued status as a separate FSM state), and outlying atolls in the west, north, 
and southeast have significant differences from, as well as longstanding ties 
with, the Lagoon population. Large size and diversity of interest promote 
multiple, contradictory tensions. The Chuuk delegation had a difficult time 
maintaining internal cohesion, given the large number of regional factions 
within their state. 
In general, Chuuk's position was that equitable divisions of power and 
funding could only be achieved by allocating them on the basis of population. 
But some of Chuuk' s delegates recognized the intimidating effect this had, and 
worked to defuse it. This was particularly the case in the matter of presidential 
selection, in which several Chuukese delegates deliberately steered clear of 
proposals providing for election of the FSM president by a simple popular vote. 
Yap mixes a relatively small population size with marked diversity of 
interest: there are the people of Yap island proper on the one hand and on the 
other the peoples of the outlying atolls (collectively known as the W oleai ), who 
speak variants of a language close I y related to Chuukese but who have long been 
dominated socially by the Yapese. Located in a position that is as close to Belau, 
Guam, and the Northern Marianas as it is to the rest of the FSM, Yap appears 
less affected by tensions that concern the others and perhaps for this reason 
seems more committed to the union. Its delegation came with a series of 
proposed changes but did not insist upon seeing them adopted. The Yapese are 
well known in Micronesia for their willingness to cooperate with, rather than 
confront, the other states. 
Pohnpei' s delegation was possibly the most fractious. Like Chuuk and Yap, 
Pohnpei State includes different populations of people, some indigenous to the 
main island and others to the outlying atolls, as well as a sizable population of 
peoples long resident on the big island who trace their ancestries and affinities 
to the atolls. The first bloc is largely fed up with the FSM, while the other two 
see it as the prime guarantee of their livelihoods. The Pohnpei State delegation 
was split by these competing concerns and manifested little in the way of 
cohesion. Nonetheless, having the FSM capital located on Pohnpei makes the 
national government's actions especially visible, and dislike for the government 
is perhaps greatest in Pohnpei State. The state's relatively large population size 
made it a candidate for favouring decisions and disbursements based on simple 
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population numbers, while its longstanding interest in seeing an independent 
Micronesia, in opposition to those who had chosen free association, inclined it 
toward support for the state sovereignty position. Though Pohnpei' s secession 
amendment played only a minor role during the ConCon itself, it may well have 
a highly significant, long-term impact on the FSM's survival. 
Interests 
In order to understand the degree to which the individual states' interests 
drove the ConCon, it is worth looking for a moment at who submitted 
proposals. Fifty-four of the proposals (52 per cent) came from state delega­
tions (or from a large enough portion of a delegation to warrant listing on the 
ConCon's official 'Status Table' as having been submitted by the delegation). 
Pohnpei 's delegation submitted 26 - nearly half - of these; Yap sponsored 
18, Chuuk 7, and Kosrae 3. Together, Pohnpei and Yap were responsible for 
over 80 per cent of the proposals submitted by delegations, a useful index of 
the two states' discontent with the status quo. 
The numbers of delegate proposals that the committees sent on to the 
plenary provide another telling index. The Yapese delegation submitted 18 
delegate proposals; I 0 of those were reported out to the plenary as committee 
proposals; 8 of these appeared on the constitutional referendum ballot. Only 9 
of the Pohnpei delegation's 26 proposals were reported out as committee 
proposals; I became a convention proposal (a status I shall explain below); and 
4 made it onto the referendum ballot. It is worth noting that 6 of Pohnpei's 
proposals dealt with technical changes in constitutional language; 4 of those 
became committee proposals; 2 appeared on the referendum ballot. When these 
figures are taken into account, the number of Pohnpei's successful substantive 
proposals is significantly different: 20 delegate proposals; 6 committee and 
convention proposals; 2 ballot items. Chuuk's delegation sponsored 7 delegate 
proposals; 4 became committee proposals; 3 appeared on the referendum ballot. 
Of Kosrae' s 3 delegate proposals, 2 became committee proposals; 1 appeared 
on the ballot. 
These figures suggest that Yap' s delegation was considerably more in tune 
with the FSM's general sentiments than were the other three. One of the Yapese 
commented that his delegation had come intending to preserve the status quo, 
but had soon realized that some changes, particularly in the method of presiden-
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tial selection, were called for. While maintaining a public posture of equanimity, 
then, the Yapese seem to have grasped precisely which changes the federation 
was prepared to accept. 
In proposing few changes, the Chuuk and Kosrae delegations displayed 
their mutual fears. Both preferred to enhance their respective states' situations 
under the status quo, rather than effect major changes in the constitution. The 
Kosraen proposals dealt with shifting authority and money to the individual 
states. Chuuk's proposals were intended to ensure that money was distributed 
on a population basis, in acknowledgment of its population's overwhelming 
size, and to defuse some of the political impact of its size by providing a 
weighted system for popular presidential elections. The relative success of the 
few proposals they offered reflects the moderation with which they approached 
the process. 
Chuukese delegates, either individually or in small groups, submitted 26 
proposals, far more than any other state's delegates. Nine of those advanced to 
committee proposals and 5 were included on the referendum ballot. The sheer 
size of Chuuk's delegation in part accounts for its lack of cohesion, but 
longstanding tensions between the eastern and western regions of Chuuk 
Lagoon, as well as differences among the various outlying atoll groups and the 
Lagoon undoubtedly played a role as well. 
The proposals submitted by Pohnpei's delegation, on the other hand, 
manifested most of the state's discontents with the status quo. Its more radical 
approach met with considerably less success than those of the other states. Given 
the rather significant differences among the various localities within the state, 
it is notable that only a few members of Pohnpei's delegation offered indi­
vidual proposals. Senator Leo Falcam submitted 1 1  proposals on his own, 4 of 
which advanced to committee proposals and 3 of which appeared on the 
referendum ballot. State Senator Yasuo Phillip, together with State Senator 
Reed Nena of Kosrae, initiated 11 proposals, only one of which appeared as a 
committee proposal and on the ballot.11 Pohnpei's proposals- like Kosrae's 
and Yap's - were generally signed by all members of the delegation, though 
Governor Resio Moses did sign the secession proposal upside down as a sign 
that he protested doing so. 
In the present context, however, two themes emerge as keys to understand­
ing the convention's dynamics. First, there were the basically structural tensions 
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between Kosrae and Chuuk: the roughly 7 ,OOO Kosraen people are apprehensive 
about the political power of the 55,000 Chuukese. These tensions were largely 
focused on the issue of political control. On the one hand, Kosraens insisted on 
state sovereignty - that is, they wanted the right to make virtually all political, 
economic, and social decisions on their own. On the other, the Chuukese, 
constituting over half the FSM population, wanted to ensure that the national 
government was responsive to their absolute majority. General agreement 
among all the delegates that the FS M national government - and more 
specifically, the Congress - had to be weakened and decentralized was 
intersected by a sense that Chuuk's overwhelming popular vote and its numeri­
cal strength in (some would say domination of) Congress permitted it to benefit 
from the status quo. 
Even as everyone spoke on behalf of decentralization, Chuuk's delegation 
was ambivalent, if not equivocal, about any change in the current state of affairs. 
Simultaneous! y, the other states were confronting the converse of this issue. By 
weakening the centre, some of them feared, they would merely unshackle the 
full power of Chuuk's absolute majority; even a strong coalition of the other 
three states could not muster enough votes to challenge Chuuk's numbers. In 
spite of openly expressed agreement on the need for change, then, the delegates 
were not at all sure that implementing the called-for changes would in fact serve 
them well. 
Secondly, there was the matter of enhancing local - that is, state -
authority in a number of contested areas. Such included, but were by no means 
limited to, the primacy of local custom, local regulation of access to land, and 
immigration among the FSM states. 12  Such items were of considerably more 
concern for the Yap and Pohnpei delegations, and only marginally engaged the 
other two states. The Yapese introduced a number of measures intended to 
protect and preserve local customs, but they eventually decided that any attempt 
to legislate in areas of custom and tradition would in the long run be morely 
likely to harm than sustain them. Pohnpei, on the other hand, vigorously pursued 
its quest for control over immigration, judicial prerogatives, and land law, and 
a number of its delegates were alienated by the ConCon's refusal to take 
seriously Pohnpei ' s  desire for amendments that would permit secession and 
grant states a say in nuclear weapons questions . 
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Each of the four state delegations brought with it a markedly different 
perspective on the nation's  future. The Con Con's business was for the most part 
conducted by four separate states working on theirown individual agendas; only 
occasionally were problems approached in terms of how they affected the FSM 
as a whole. The 24 amendments finally approved by the ConCon made it 
through the complex process largely because they represented no significant 
threat to any individual state. Although 'unity' was a watchword throughout the 
ConCon' s duration, it was more of a shibboleth than an apt characterization of 
what was either aspired to or could be observed in action. 
Doubt, fear, mistrust, suspicion 
Kosrae' s  Governor Yosiwo George, one of the ConCon's more influential 
figures, summed up his state's concerns - and probably those of most, if not 
all, of the others - at the outset. On the fourth day, as the delegates were 
about to vote on the key change in the ConCon's rule on consensus (see 
below), Governor George delivered a short speech, in which he noted 
Kosrae' s  'disappointment and unhappiness ' ,  and observed that the ConCon's 
atmosphere was plagued by 'elements of doubt, elements of fear, elements of 
mistrust, and elements of suspicion' .  Then, responding to widespread rumours 
that the Kosraen delegation would withdraw from the ConCon if the consen­
sus rule were changed, he said he was 'saddened' to hear of 'fears that one 
delegation may block the efforts and actions of other delegations ' .  Referring 
to a comment he had made on the previous day, concerning the Kosrae 
delegation's  mandate for 'sovereign recognition of the states ' ,  he explained 
Kosrae' s  hope that the ConCon' s  work would 'strengthen the unity of this 
nation' .  Kosrae' s hope for unity, then, was couched in its insistence on state 
sovereignty and a context of fear and distrust, that is, in barely disguised 
disunity. 
At about the same time, a Pohnpeian leader, speaking off the record, 
explained his people's  inclination to leave the FSM, expressed at a series of 
public hearings convened by the state's  ConCon delegation: 'We heard it from 
everyone. They gave us many different reasons - and some were perhaps silly 
- but they all reached the same conclusion' .  The main reason for this outlook, 
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he explained, was land and the fear of permitting non-Pohnpeians access to it, 
given the very limited amount left on the island for the Pohnpeians themselves. 
The delegation found itself confronting 'a dilemma', he said. While they saw the 
desirability of promoting unity because of the need for stability, they also felt 
responsible to the people who sent them to the ConCon. A resolution to this 
dilemma, he suggested, might lie in the battle over consensus versus a three­
quarters vote . 
The others say unity is necessary. Pohnpei says that if there is no unity 
after ten years of nationhood, then it will never come. If we can work 
something out, fine; but if there is no agreement, then the die is cast. 
We are different peoples, speaking different languages, with different 
cultures . 
Pohnpei 's desire for separation, like Kosrae 's insistence on state sovereignty, 
was charged with a sense that unity was already a lost cause . 
The ConCon 's delegates ultimately did approve nearly a quarter of the 
proposed amendments, suggesting that there was in fact some agreement, if 
hardly true unity. In the 1991  constitutional ratifying referendum, however, 
only four of the proposed amendments were ratified by the FSM '  s voters. 
Though Yap and Pohnpei seemed eager to respond to the FSM '  s problems, 
Kosrae and Chuuk apparent! y feared that any change in the status quo could only 
harm them. The efforts of the 3 1  delegates to the 1991 ConCon ended as they 
began, then,  in a degree of mutual suspicion and fear that reduced unity to a 
slogan. 
The FSM 's difficulties with national unity, though not so pressing as, say, 
Papua New Guinea 's problems in Bougainville, spring from the same roots: 
sectional differences exacerbated by ethnic consciousness. Geographical and 
historical differences have created disparities over which Micronesians contest, 
but the character, intensity, and likely outcomes of these contests are being 
hammered out in the forge of ethnicity. No simple calculus of cost and benefit 
is likely to tell us much about the future of these multi-ethnic nation-states in an 
era of resurgent nationalism. 
The convention gets underway 
The ConCon was first called to order on 1 6  July 1990, in the FSM capital's 
Congressional Chamber, in the Palikir region of Pohnpei ' s Sokehs municipal-
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ity. Congress had legislated a 30-day convention, with the possibility of a 15-
day extension. From the outset, the delegates assumed that they would require 
all 45 days to complete their work, but the ConCon' s leadership opted not to 
schedule the extension until the 30 days were nearly up in order to ensure that 
everyone worked as efficiently as possible. As it turned out, on the final night 
the convention stopped the clock at midnight and continued labouring into the 
early hours of the 46th day in order to complete their task. 
Consensus 
Following the opening ceremonies, the ConCon immediately set about modi­
fying its rules. In the enabling legislation that established the ConCon, the 
FSM Congress had mandated that changes to the constitution could only be 
made by 'consensus' - that is, with the concurrence of all four state delega­
tions. Pohnpei's delegation introduced an amendment to the convention's 
rules making a three-quarters majority (i.e. three of the four states) all that 
would be necessary for final approval of proposed amendments. In doing so, it 
initiated a process that mirrored in microcosm most of the issues animating 
the ConCon. 
According to the amicus brief filed by the FSM Congress, the original 
enabling legislation called for only three-quarters majority approval. 13  After 
particularly intense lobbying by Kosrae ' s  leaders, however, the legislation was 
modified to require consensus. 14 Kosrae' s concern with issues of population size 
and the preservation of state 'sovereignty' were evident well before the Con Con 
got underway. 
Given that the number of delegates each state would send to the ConCon 
was to be based on its population size, Kosrae ' s leaders maintained that the 
smaller states had already been relegated to speaking with a 'diminished voice' 
and that unanimity therefore provided them with the only guarantee that their 
sovereignty - that is, their right not to be required to do anything they had not 
acquiesced to -would not be threatened. One of Chuuk' s senators, on the other 
hand, explained that it was difficult for the larger states to accept equal 
representation with the small states; he wanted to preserve the initial three­
quarters majority stipulation. 
The final committee report on the three-quarters majority versus consensus 
question emphasized that its recommendation in favour of consensus was in 
keeping with both the principle of state sovereignty and the 'Micronesian Way' 
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of decision-making. The amended bill, requiring consensus, passed by a three­
to-one vote, over Chuuk's opposition. When the ConCon's leaders later 
challenged this requirement in court, they did not lose sight of the irony that a 
claim on behalf of consensus as 'the Micronesian Way' was based on a vote that 
had carried by only a three-quarters majority. 
While Kosrae and Chuuk had staked out the lines of their essential 
disagreements before plans for the ConCon had even been laid, Pohnpei' s 
position continued to evolve as its ConCon delegation travelled through the state 
holding public hearings to determine which issues the Pohnpeians wanted 
addressed. The delegation's interests (which were by no means shared by all its 
members) seem to have lain in using the rules-change test as a stalking horse for 
other issues. It appears that the Pohnpeian delegation hoped to establish itself 
as the ConCon' s moving force and viewed the change from unanimity to a three­
quarters majority as a means toward implementing its programme. In doing so, 
it was following a course earlier charted by Belau, which had had such a great 
impact on the drafting of the original Micronesian Constitution, despite the fact 
that it was already engaged in a process that would ultimately see it refuse to 
enter into the Micronesian federation. 
As the ConCon considered asking the FSM Supreme Court to decide 
whether the ConCon or the Congress had the ultimate authority over the 
ConCon's  rules, Pohnpeian delegate Leo Falcam, who steadfastly opposed 
sending the matter to a court which at that time included only American judges, 
argued, 'Perhaps this decision foreshadows thefailure ofunity. Why else would 
we choose a non-Micronesian to resolve the dispute?' . 
Pohnpei was hardly alone in raising the spectre of disunity and secession. 
During initial congressional discussions concerning the consensus/three-quar­
ters majority issue, Kosraean and Pohnpeian senators raised the possibility of a 
state deserting either the ConCon or the Federation if it did not agree with the 
decision (FSM Congress 1989 :2). The amicus brief filed by the FSM Congress 
referred repeated! y to the possibility that an unacceptable outcome might result 
in a state 'walking out' of the ConCon or even an outright act of secession 
(ibid. : !  I ,  et passim). When one Micronesian Supreme Court administratorfirst 
learned that the ConCon had indeed voted to change the rule and was about to 
ask the Court to render a decision on its right to do so, he exclaimed that Kosrae 
and Yap would leave the ConCon if consensus were overturned. And when a 
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state flag was knocked over by an errant breeze during the ConCon's  opening 
ceremonies, one observer in the gallery commented jovially, 'That's a good 
sign: "We have taken a walk !'" 
The possibilities of withdrawal, disunity, and secession that underlay nearly 
every aspect of the ConCon particularly informed the initial rules debate. 
Governor George, head of Kosrae's  delegation, argued repeatedly against the 
proposed change in the rules. He first described the FSM as 'a loose federation' 
with authority lodged in the states, not in the central government, and this, he 
explained, meant that consensus on the part of all four states was necessary to 
institute any changes . Later, he added that Kosrae's delegation had come to 
the ConCon with 'a  mandate for sovereign recognition of the states' .  
Any change in the consensus rule would defy that mandate. 
On the ConCon' s third day, when the issue came finally to a vote, Governor 
George suggested that some states seemed eager to paralyze the ConCon. 
Despite Kosrae's general opposition to the ConCon itself and its very specific 
opposition to the abrogation of the consensus requirement, he said, his delega­
tion was willing to accept the rule change 'because we believe in working 
together. We will support this resolution only because we want to go along' .  As 
an example ofKosrae' s historic willingness to cooperate, he cited a clause in the 
original constitution specifying that all externally-provided funds must be 
divided into five equal parts (one part each for the states and the central 
government). This has never been implemented, he went on. Divisions of these 
moneys have not been equally apportioned, but, believing in consensus, Kosrae 
has accepted the injustice. Even as it was bending to the will of the majority, 
then, Kosrae was determined to expain why it was not in its best interests to do 
so. 
Following the vote on the rules change, which passed, according to the 
clerk's count of hands, by a 20-8 margin, the question of whether the ConCon 
had the authority to change its own rules was sent on to the FSM Supreme 
Court. 1 5  Two key issues were raised in the course of these proceedings;  both 
reflected underlying concerns that animated every aspect of the ConCon. One 
was the degree of power that had been gradually accruing to the FSM Congress 
and to the national government in general. The other was the role Micronesian 
'custom' and/or 'tradition' should play in guiding the activities of a Micronesian 
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government. Each of these had to do with the fundamental issue of the states' 
autonomy and their basic rights to govern themselves as they - and not the 
national government saw fit. 
Before the Supreme Court 
The court battle itself was complicated by several factors. The FSM Attorney 
General's Office, which was respondent to the ConCon' s  request for a ruling, 
had itself argued in favour of a three-quarters majority when the original 
legislation was under discussion; a number of the ConCon's  legal advisers 
were attorneys on the FSM Congress's  legislative staff; the FSM Supreme 
Court's chief justice, Edward King, had opposed a ConCon at the time people 
were voting on whether to convene one; it was difficult to find a high-ranking 
Micronesian justice from one of the state supreme courts who had not already 
taken a political position on the issue; and some ConCon delegates were 
outspoken in their opposition to having American judges make such a crucial 
decision. 16 At one point, while the ConCon was discussing how it might 
proceed with its arguments in court, one delegate went so far as to ask that the 
chamber be cleared of all members of the Congressional legal staff, to lessen 
the possibility of exposing the strategies they were exploring. 
Senator Falcam was especially outspoken in his opposition to having the 
American chief justice preside over a case that might have much to do with the 
shape of Micronesia's future. Because the Con Con might well take steps that 
would limit the Supreme Court's  power, he argued, it would be in the Court's  
interest to  hinder the ConCon. The Court's self-interest lay in preserving its own 
power, he concluded, appealing to the shared sentiment that each branch of the 
central government would be inclined to oppose every attempt on the delegates' 
part to change the nature of Micronesian government. 
At the hearing, the ConCon' s attorneys opened their arguments by referring 
to a briefing paper prepared by Norman Meller for the 1975 Micronesian 
Constitutional Convention. 17 This document pointed out to the delegates that, 
among other things, providing for subsequent constitutional conventions would 
assure a good means of getting around the possibility that Congress would prove 
unwilling to change itself. In developing this argument, the ConCon's counsel 
put forward what he called a 'structural argument' : 
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The convention is one of three alternative methods prescribed in the 
Constitution for amendments :  convention, initiative, and Congress. If 
Congress is allowed to restrict the other two methods, to the extent that 
they are thereby rendered impracticable or incapable of use, in effect 
there will be only one method - the congressional method ( Constitu­
tional Convention 1990 v. President of the FSM:8). 
Only constitutional revisions made by conventions could assure independence 
from Congress, he continued, and though Congress certainly has the right to 
set some limits on conventions, it does not - as it seems to claim in its amicus 
brief - have the right to operate without limits. 
The FSM attorney general responded that the right to provide for constitu­
tional conventions had been given to Congress and that Congress retained this 
right until the constitution itself revoked it. He then went on to argue that the real 
issue at stake was Congress ' s  responsibility for safeguarding Micronesian 
tradition, as specified in article V of the constitution: 'The traditions of the 
people of Micronesia may be protected by statute. If challenged as violative of 
Article IV [the 'Declaration of Rights' ] ,  protection of Micronesian tradition 
shall be considered a compelling social purpose warranting such governmental 
action' . Congressional insistence on the unanimity requirement was, he ex­
plained, in keeping with the 'Micronesian Way ' ,  which is consensus. He argued 
that the question at issue was in fact the right of the Micronesian peoples to 
protect their traditions versus their right to change their constitution, and that 
because protecting tradition is to be considered a compelling social purpose, it 
should prevail. The problem, he concluded, is a political matter and therefore 
nonjusticiable; the Court should not be deciding this case. 
In stating its own case, as a friend of the court, Congress argued that in 
keeping with the Micronesian way of consensus, no state should be forced to 
accept something it does not approve. Moreover, it continued, the apparent 
opposition between small states demanding state sovereignty and large states 
concerned with population equity had already been resolved though the ConCon' s 
voting procedures. On the first reading,  where decisions were made by the vote 
ofindividual delegates, the larger states were able to set the agenda. Through the 
vote on second reading, where decisions were to be made by consensus of the 
four state delegations, the smaller states were assured of control over the 
ConCon' s final outcome. 
The Court decided the case in favour of the Con Con, ruling that it did indeed 
have the right to establish its own procedures. In the time-consuming process of 
changing the rules and then fighting to implement the change, the delegates 
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confronted the ConCon' s key themes. Kosrae was given an opportunity to insist 
on the primacy of state sovereignty. Congress reiterated its insistence on its own 
primacy in all FSM affairs. Arguments drawing on custom and tradition proved 
to be popular, ubiquitous, vague, and inconclusive. The Pohnpei delegation's 
notion that it might spark a confrontation that could give it a leading role in 
charting the ConCon's direction came finally to naught: it was neither able to 
take on a leading role (in fact no delegation did) nor to position itself to 
dramatically withdraw in protest. In the end, the court case did serve to help 
fashion a sense of cohesion among the delegates even as it demonstrated to them 
the very substantial differences among their various positions. 
As with the ConCon itself, the key to understanding the rules change issue 
lies in the notion of 'unity' . The four state delegations were united in their 
unhappiness with Congress and the national government, but their disagree­
ments kept them charting a common course. The court case was significant not 
for its outcome- no item was able to pass on first reading without the support 
of all four delegations - but because, first, it so clearly portrayed the strained 
relations between the ConCon and Congress, and, secondly, because it dem­
onstrated Kosrae's force of purpose; despite its small size, Kosrae was a force 
to be reckoned with. 
Having determined that constitutional amendments could be approved with 
a three-quarters majority, the delegates then started to work. 
The Proposals 1 - overview 
At the outset, the process of developing delegate proposals was, to say the 
least, clumsy. The ConCon's legal staff had assumed that each state delega­
tion was developing its own drafts for submission. It also assumed that each 
delegation had canvassed its constituents, caucused, and formulated a prelimi­
nary list of the amendments it wished to pursue. Though several delegations 
had spent considerable time in public hearings and had even drawn up lists of 
'some of the issues raised and discussed' (as the Pohnpei delegation's infor­
mal list phrased it) at these meetings, only Yap seemed to have thoroughly 
considered the amendments it intended to propose.18 The earliest proposals 
were introduced and signed by entire delegations. In time, however, a consid­
erable number of proposals was introduced and signed by only a few (in some 
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cases, only a single) delegates. On several occasions, individual delegates 
from different states jointly offered a proposal, but for the most part the 
introduction of proposals was seen as the responsibility of states, not individu­
als. The very organization of the ConCon's work, then, amply reflected its 
political nature: the delegates viewed the constitutional process as a matter for 
the states - not the 'Micronesian people' - to conduct. 19 
As the number of proposed amendments gradually swelled, the ConCon 's 
de facto executive body, the Special Conference Committee, set a deadline for 
the submission of proposals, in the hope of ensuring that adequate time remained 
for dealing with them. By the time this arbitrary date arrived, 99 proposals had 
been drafted and submitted. Eventually, five more were added, bringing the total 
to 104. A number of these submissions proposed alternative means for 
effecting changes in the same constitutional articles ;  the issue of presidential 
selection, for example, drew 13 proposals. (Table 1 on page 30 provides a 
summary categorization of the delegate proposals submitted to the 1990 
ConCon.) 
Of 104 proposed amendments, 77 (74 per cent) were intended either 
primarily or largely to shift power and/or money from the national government 
to the states. When the 11  technical amendments concerned with the language 
of transition from Trust territory status and the initial establishment of the FSM 
are excluded, leaving 93 substantive amendments, the percentage rises to 83 
percent. By a margin of better than four -to-one, then, the work of the ConCon 
consisted of finding ways to provide the four FSM states with greater control 
over their national government. 20 
I first consider some of the major topics - issues that were widely 
discussed - that failed to gain adequate support, and then tum my analysis to 
proposals largely or significantly concerned with issues reasonably described as 
ethnic in origin or character. 
Presidential selection 
Presidential selection presented the Micronesians with a glaring problem. The 
FSM employs a hybrid system to choose its chief executive. Though the FSM 
Congress has only a single house, each state delegation includes both senators 
elected from population-apportioned districts for two-year terms and a single 
at-large senator elected for a four-year term. From among these four at-large, 
four-year senators, Congress itself selects a president and vice president (who 
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Table 1 :  Summary of delegate proposals, 1990 FSM Constitutional Convention 
1 1  Technical language changes resulting from the transition from the Trusteeship 
to the FSM 
13a Selection of the President and Vice-President, including specific requirements 
for rotation among the states and popular elections 
ga Congress, including increases in number of seats, establishing a bicameral 
congress, and term length 
5a FSM Supreme Court, including term limits and requirements for use of local 
precedents 
6a Specific controls over Congressional spending 
4a Tighter bureaucratic controls, including Public Auditor, Public Service 
Commission, and independent prosecutor 
4 Requiring FSM citizenship for the Presidential Cabinet, Supreme Court, land­
ownership, etc. 
4 Constitutional Convention changes 
33a Other limits on central government, including restatements of revenue­
sharing, definitions of concurrent powers, and explicit allocation of residual 
powers to the states 
3a Other revenue-sharing proposals 
3 Civil rights and legal procedures 
10h Miscellaneous other proposals, including secession provisions, nuclear-free 
provisions, and provisions for establishing a Chamber of Chiefs 
Notes: a Proposed amendments entirely or significantly concerned with limiting national 
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government power and/or revenues or enhancing state government power and/or revenues. 
b Five of these proposed amendments were entirely or significantly concerned with 
limiting national government power and/or revenues or enhancing state government power 
and/or revenues. 
are then replaced in by-elections). There has been a general understanding in 
the FSM that the presidency should rotate among the states, but this is not a 
matter of law. There had also been a sense that after Chuuk' s  Toshiwo 
Nakayama served the first two terms, Pohnpei ' s  four-year senator would be 
chosen as the FSM' s second president. For reasons too complex to detail here, 
this did not come to pass; Yap's John Haglelegam was chosen, to Pohnpei' s  
considerable dissatisfaction and widespread assumption that Chuuk' s Con­
gressional delegation had engineered the switch. 2 1  Though the so-called 
' gentleman's agreement' concerning rotation had not been expressly broken, 
it had been made clear that the large Chuukese congressional delegation 
possessed enough power to control the office, and the question of selecting 
future presidents became something of a burning national question. There was 
general agreement that some form of guaranteed rotation among the states was 
critical to the survival of the federation, but disagreements about other aspects 
of the selection process (manifested in the 1 3 different proposals concerning 
it) kept the delegates from finding common ground. 
As with so many other issues, the problem of revising the presidential 
selection process foundered on the fundamental opposition between population 
size and state sovereignty. Some felt that power over the process was best 
removed from Congress by giving it to the people through a simple popular 
vote. Several Chuukese delegates, however, saw their own state' s size and 
consequent power as possibly the greatest threat to the FSM' s continued union, 
and they sought to limit this imbalance and its potential for disruption by 
proposing a complex formula. This provided for a popular election employing 
a proportional weighting of votes, which would give each state an equal say in 
determining the outcome. The complex formula they devised, as well-meaning 
as it was, received almost no attention. 
Ultimately, attempts to resolve the presidential issue foundered on a lack of 
trust. The degree of suspicion among the states was perhaps as great as their 
shared distrust of the national government. The delegates were confounded by 
what I have already described as one of the ConCon' s inherent dilemmas: it 
was feared that any attempt to weaken the central government as a means of 
enhancing the power of the states was likely to result in an equally problematic 
situation in which the differential sizes and strengths of the states allowed one 
or two states to dominate the federation, at the expense of the others. Such a 
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solution would have merely replicated - rather than remedied - the problem 
the delegates had set out to resolve. The Chuukese delegates' repeated refer­
ences to population equality and Kosrae' s preoccupation with state sovereignty 
made everyone conscious not only of the opposition between them but of the 
improbability of achieving a resolution agreeable to both. 
External relations 
Although this essay is primarily concerned with ethnic - that is, internal -
tensions within the FSM, these tensions are exacerbated by the federation's 
relations with the US.  In order to comprehend the emphasis on state sover­
eignty, it is necessary to look briefly at the question of national sovereignty, as 
it was raised during the course of the ConCon. Many of the proposals dealt 
with local ambivalence regarding the FSM' s external relations, especially 
with the US. Micronesians dislike an overly centralized government at least 
partly because of the way the central government is (or can be) used by the US 
to further its own policies. These difficulties are shared by many post-colonial 
governments, and are elements of modem nationalist equations in general. 
Both Yap and Pohnpei introduced proposals intended to further restrict the 
right of foreign powers (i.e. , the US) to bring hazardous materials and weapons 
into the FSM. The original constitution prohibits testing, storage, use ,  or 
disposal of 'radioactive, toxic chemical, or other harmful substances' within the 
FSM 'without the express approval of the national government' (Article Xlll, 
Section 2). Like many of the others Pohnpei introduced, this proposal (Del. 
Prop. 6) was intended to transfer a degree of decision-making authority to the 
states by requiring that express approval of the relevant state also be granted. 
Yap's proposal (Del. Prop. 3 1 )  simply deleted the qualifying clause 'without 
express approval of the national government' ,  leaving the remainder of the 
original article to specify categorically that these materials not be introduced 
into the FSM. 
This issue provoked one of the Con Con's more sensitive discussions. The 
Compact of Free Association, which the FSM constitution specifies is subordi­
nate to itself, grants the US authority to determine how best to provide for the 
FSM's security and thereby perpetuates effective American control over the 
islands. 22 In the course of several meetings of the General Provisions Com­
mittee, the FSMDepartment of External Affairs found itself explaining that any 
act the US might construe as a movement in the direction of an alignment with 
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the Nuclear-Free Pacific movement would immediately elicit an American 
demand for discussions, at which the FSM would be informed that it was in 
violation of the Compact and therefore in danger of losing the funding it secures 
(i.e., the source of most of the FSM' s income). 
In dealing with this issue, the committee was forced to confront one of the 
ConCon's generally unspoken subtexts: the complex web of control the US 
retains over Micronesia. The Compact provides the US with a formal right to 
interfere in Micronesian affairs in the name of security. But beyond this right to 
intrude, the US has the capacity to cut off the Compact funding, citing 
noncompliance, and thereby bring the entire country to a halt. Through a process 
arranged and managed by the Merrill Lynch investment firm, the FSM has 
issued bonds that provide them with funds now in exchange for guarantees 
underwritten by later Compact payments. S ome Micronesian leaders argue that 
Merrill Lynch uses its fiduciary role to dictate policy to the national government. 
One member of the committee explicit! y cited this arrangement, reminding the 
other delegates that when he had worked on the bond issue a question of how 
secure the payments would be under the Compact had been raised. The rating 
of the bonds, he explained, had been affected by the fact that the funds can be 
cut off if the terms of the Compact are breached. 
A number of committee members accepted this state of affairs with apparent 
equanimity and the chairman quickly tabled the two antinuclear proposals 
permanently. This action troubled Pohnpei' s representatives on the committee; 
they asked to have at least one of the proposals reported back to the plenary, even 
if it did not carry a favourable recommendation. The chairman responded, 
'We're aware of the reasons we're tabling this in committee. We don't want to 
broadcast them' . 
Much of the Micronesians' dislike for big government - one of the fears 
that drove the Con Con -derives from the national government' s  ability (if not 
responsibility) to implement US policy. This episode provided delegates with 
a perfect example of how US policies get implemented by default. The 
committee chairman demonstrated precisely the abuse of authority thePohnpeians 
had come prepared to do away with. 
In a similar vein, another unsuccessful proposal provoked more debate. It 
was one of a number of proposals intended to make 'technical' modifications 
(called 'housekeeping' amendments by some) in the language of the original 
constitution, which had been drafted before it was clear which districts of the old 
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trust territory would become part of the FSM and before negotiations had 
established the nature of its new relationship with the US. One of these 
amendments (Del. Prop. 84) proposed to delete most of Article XVI of the 
constitution, entitled 'Effective Date ' .  The final sentence of this article stipu­
lates that 
If a provision of this Constitution is held to be in fundamental conflict 
with the United Nations Charter or the Trusteeship Agreement between 
the United States of America and the United Nations, the provision 
does not become effective until the date of termination of the Trustee­
ship Agreement. 
As it happened, when the 1990 ConCon convened, twelve years after the 
original constitution's  ratification, the Trusteeship Agreement had yet to be 
terminated. The proposed amendment was meant to convince foreign govern­
ments that the Trusteeship Agreement was no longer in effect. 23 Senator Falcam 
wanted to demonstrate that 
we are a sovereign nation, with the exception of powers that we 
voluntarily assign to other nations to take care of. If we don' t  do this, it 
may call into question our sovereignty. It may affect powers of the 
national government and states with respect to the US. It is a step 
declaring that the Trusteeship Agreement is terminated and that the 
FSM is a sovereign and independent nation. 
The proposal led to a lengthy debate -both philosophical and practical in 
character - about the nature of the FSM' s sovereignty and the status of the 
Trusteeship Agreement. Two arguments were particularly striking. One had to 
do with the ontological problem of sovereignty: does it lie entirely within the 
purview of the people who claim it, or does it is also contingent upon the 
recognition of others? The second was an eloquent plea concerning the 
historical impact of the constitution' s  language. 24 'It is necessary' ,  insisted one 
delegate, 'for our descendants to know how this came about. It was by an orderly 
transition, not war. The US supported the birth of our constitutional government 
here' . 
In the first of these two debates, the General Provisions Committee simply 
overlooked the problematic question of sovereignty, treating external con­
straints on FSM policies as perhaps inconvenient but essentially untroubling 
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facts; if the FSM cannot undertake certain actions because of its relationship to 
the US, it is an issue to be downplayed or ignored. In the second, it was rather 
vociferously argued that as a fully sovereign, 'independent' nation-state, the 
only external constraints were those 'voluntarily assigned', and that any 
international misunderstanding of the FSM' s independent status should be 
clarified. The marked contrast between the tenor and content of these two sets 
of discussions is evidence of both the ambiguous nature of the FSM' s free 
association relationship with the US and the delegates' ambivalent feelings 
about this ambiguity. For some it appears to have been convenient and 
unproblematic, for others it was profoundly disturbing. 
Another proposal that never made it out of committee is also relevant here. 
Pohnpei' s delegatioo had submitted an amendment (Del. Prop. 88) allowing for 
secession from the FSM. A delegate from Kosrae, which had hinted that it might 
leave the union if the consensus requirement for successful proposals were not 
upheld, suggested that the main purpose of secession was as a threat; this 
perspective was echoed by a number of other committee members, one of whom 
described it as 'a club over the head' .25 Governor George observed that he 
would not want a municipality seceding from his state . He worried, moreover, 
about the image of the FSM such an amendment might project externally, 
hampering FSM leaders' negotiations for foreign assistance. Having polled the 
committee members for their opinions, the Chairman of the General Provisions 
Committee proceeded to call for a vote, even though seven affirmative votes 
were needed in order to approve the proposal and only seven of twelve 
committee members were present . When the vote split three to three (the 
chairman abstaining), the issue was dropped.  
This may appear at face value to have been an inconsequential event in the 
course of a constitutional convention, but it is likely to have continuing 
repercussions over the next few years. One of the Pohnpeian delegates seemed 
particularly troubled by the summary treatment this proposal received. It had 
been taken up for final consideration immediately after the chairman had tabled 
the proposals dealing with nuclear weapons, and the juxtaposition of the 
treatment given the two proposals provoked an unusually visible response by the 
standards of comity that characterize most Micronesian political intercourse. 
This delegate quietly rose and left the small room in which the committee was 
meeting. The chairman asked the only other Pohnpeian delegate present if the 
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man was upset. 'I think he felt it should have been brought to the floor. It came 
out of our Leadership Conference' (i.e., out of the public hearings). The man' s  
abrupt departure must b e  explained in terms o f  kanegamah, a trait highly prized 
by Pohnpeians,  which keeps adults from displaying their feelings in public 
(Petersen 1 993). He could display his pique only by leaving. Pohnpei' s  
delegation had come to the ConCon with a series of issues that had been raised 
in meetings throughout the state. The matter of secession headed the list of 
amendments the Pohnpeian people wanted their delegates to pursue, and 
reflected their longstanding unhappiness with both the operations of the national 
government and its relationship with the US. Pohnpei ' s  proposal, giving states 
veto power over the introduction of nuclear weapons into their territory, was 
tabled without even a vote and then its proposal on secession was voted down 
with only a bare majority of the committee's members present; together these 
actions signalled that Pohnpei 's proposals were not being taken seriously. The 
delegate's walkout can perhaps be understood as symbolic of Pohnpei 's attitude 
toward the federation, while the committee chairman' s  behaviour might be 
taken as emblematic of precisely that which the Pohnpeians had come to dislike 
about it. In time, the treatment given these key proposals will add to general 
Pohnpeian discontent with both the national government and its partners in the 
federation. The episode provides a good example of the fundamental problem 
Pohnpei sees itself facing within the Micronesian federation: Pohnpei is not 
being governed by Pohnpeians. 
The Proposals II - the states 
While much of the ConCon turned on issues of the states' powers in relation to 
the central government, underlying ethnic tensions were manifest in relations 
between states ; particularly the right of each state to govern itself according to 
its own customs, traditions, and precedents. The Pohnpeians pushed this 
theme farther than the others, introducing proposals that would guarantee to 
the states rights over access to land, work, and even entry into the state. 
Among these were the right to exclude not only foreigners, but also other 
Micronesians - including citizens or residents of the other FSM states . We 
are now ready for a closer look at some of the proposals that met with failure 
at the committee level. 
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Yap -protecting and preserving custom 
The Yapese delegation introduced a series of proposals concerned with issues 
of custom and tradition: allowing states to introduce capital punishment (Del. 
Prop. 1 4); to define for themselves cruel and unusual punishment (Del. Prop. 
32) ; to reassert traditional claims to fishing grounds (Del. Prop. 1 6) ;  and to 
extend certain protections to customs and traditions not protected by statute 
(Del. Props. 1 5 , 97). The capital punishment and cruel and unusual punish­
ment items met with strong resistance at public hearings, where the FSM 
attorney general 's  staff, a representative of the Micronesian Legal Services 
Corporation, and other speakers argued that such penalties are obsolete and 
outdated. One of Yap' s delegates explained that these proposals had been 
generated at public meetings, at which many Yapese made it clear that they 
wanted to reintroduce more stringent social controls. 
A question of interstate relations was raised when the Yapese submitted a 
proposal concerning submerged reefs. This amendment had initially been 
prompted by some of Yap' s unsatisfactory dealings with the national govern­
ment, but it quickly became apparent that the issue touched upon unresolved 
tensions among several of the states. Taking up the question of the FSM national 
government' s  control over Micronesian waters, the original delegate proposal 
( 16) specified that in addition to the 1 2-mile limit on state control over 
surrounding waters, 'traditional ownership of submerged reefs shall be recog­
nized, and traditional claims on resources between islands or areas traditionally 
claimed by island groups shall be recognized' .  In submitting this proposal, the 
Y apese delegation was asserting local ownership of these resources over and 
against that of the national government. Their language foreshadowed a later 
debate over the division of fishing royalties: 'Those reefs didn't  just fall down 
from the sky. They were there before 1 97 5, so someone must have rights over 
them' . 
The normal opposition of the FSM' s bureaucrats was of course brought to 
bear during the public hearing. Territoral waters had to be national in character, 
maintained the attorney general 's  office, because under the Law of the Sea, 
'only a nation can define and defend them, not a part of a nation' .  The 
Micronesian Maritime Authority acknowledged that it did not know whose the 
submerged reefs were, but explained that its efforts to negotiate fishing treaties 
would be compromised. 'How do you determine twelve miles from a submerged 
reef when you' re at sea?' Governor George offered a clear-cut solution, arguing 
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that there should be no more national waters. The four states should divide the 
FSM' s waters among themselves - 'It would be in line with state sovereignty' ,  
he explained. 
As the committee members talked among themselves, however, they began 
to recognize another, deeper, problem. Many of the relevant areas have not been 
mapped, though they do have local names. In the complex of atolls and reefs 
stretching between Yap island and Chuuk Lagoon there are numerous disputed 
claims over traditional ownership. It became clear that the dispute lay as much 
among the states as between them and the national government. As it was 
drafted, the proposal called for recognition of claims on the resources not only 
of submerged reefs but of 'areas traditionally claimed by island groups ' .  One 
delegate present during this discussion, not a member of the General Provisions 
Committee but a highly influential member of the Con Con, observed that Chuuk 
traditionally claims the Woleai (an area which in broadest usage includes nearly 
all the atolls within the current boundaries of Yap state)26: 'If this goes in the 
Constitution, then Chuuk could claim a much larger territory' ,  he said, specify­
ing, perhaps ironically, that his remarks were off the record. This comment came 
as the hearing adjourned and it was difficult to judge its immediate impact, but 
the committee did not take the issue up again in public until it met to vote on the 
proposal 'with the deletion of language extending the application of the 
proposed amendment to areas of the sea other than submerged reefs' (General 
Provisions Committee Minutes 20 August 1 990). Obviously, a nerve had been 
struck. The Committee Proposal 22, carefully pared down, did not draw any 
discussion when it went before the the plenary for first reading. It did, however, 
receive four negative votes, all of them from Chuukese, and barely passed 25-
4. Once more, it would appear, some of Chuuk's  delegates had their doubts 
about assigning resources to states rather than to the national treasury. 
The fate of the two proposals intended to provide greater legal protection to 
custom and tradition is more complex. As it was initially submitted, Delegate 
Proposal 1 5  simply inserted a few words into the constitution's  Article X, 
Section 9(b), so that it read, 'A civil right or customary right may be impaired 
only to the extent actually required for the preservation of peace, health, or 
safety' (the emphasis marks the added wording). Delegate Proposal 97 was 
meant to amend Article V, Section 2, which states that Micronesian traditions 
'may be protected by statute' and makes protection of Micronesian traditions 'a 
compelling social purpose' in cases where it  is  claimed that traditions violate 
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civil rights. The proposed amendment stipulated that 'those traditions not 
protected by statute shall be entitled to the same treatment, provided that the 
tradition subject to challenge is found to exist by the Court hearing the 
challenge' . The consensus of the Committee on Ci vii Liberties and Tradition in 
the second case and of the ConCon in the first was that the more Micronesian 
customs and traditions were written into the law, the greater were the threats to 
them. The proposal grew out of concerns that had developed in the aftermath of 
a cholera outbreak in the Chuuk Lagoon area, during which the FSM national 
government had taken steps to impose a quarantine by preventing the movement 
of foodstuffs out of the area. In discussions at the committee level, it become 
clear that at least someChuukese saw this as a threat to the viability of traditional 
first fruits obligations. At the ConCon's pre-convention meeting, where some 
of the major concerns facing the ConCon were first raised, there had been some 
discussion of the FSM's need for greater authority to impede customary rights 
during such emergencies. It was in response to such threats that these amend­
ments were offered. 
The committee was divided over whether the new language would actually 
serve the opposite purpose, that is, enhance the president' s powers. It was in 
order to allay these doubts that the amendments were completely rewritten as 
Committee Proposal 3. Rather than inserting 'customary right ' after 'civil 
right', however, the revised draft added a new sentence to Article X, Section 
9(b ): 'Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, a customary right shall not 
be suspended, restricted, infringed upon, or impaired by the President during a 
declared state of emergency' . In this form it combined elements of both delegate 
proposals. 
In their report the committee took great pains to explain what it meant by 
'customs and traditions ', following their own lengthy discussions of the topic. 
They grappled with the fundamental problem facing any attempt to encompass 
Micronesian customs, that is, the fact that Micronesia is itself an artificial 
construct: 
Your Committee notes that the people of the Federated States of 
Micronesia have different customs and traditions unique to their re­
spective localities. Customs and traditions cannot be defined with 
precision. However, the citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia 
know what their customs and traditions are in their respective locali­
ties. The protected customs and traditions may include but need not be 
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limited to the following: ( 1 )  what is known as "facsin" in the State of 
Kosrae; (2) what is known as "tiahk." in the State of Pohnpei; (3) what 
is known as "ooreni" in the State of Chuuk; and (4) what is known as 
"yalen" or "kafal fuluy" in the S tate of Yap (Standing Comm.Rept. 10). 
The report goes on to acknowledge, for example, that 'it will be difficult for 
non-Pohnpeians to understand what the "ti ahk" in Pohnpei is ' ,  citing each of the 
states in tum, and then adding that 'On the other hand, it is simple for a 
Pohnpeian to understand what the 'tiahk' in Pohnpei is ' .  Moreover, the 
committee 'also recognizes that there are other customs and traditions that are 
not mentioned here; for example, the customs for the outer islands of the State 
of Pohnpei such as Kapingamarangi ' .  27 
The committee had to work slowly through conflicting notions about the 
meanings of 'custom' and 'tradition' .  One Micronesian legal adviser insisted 
that the 1 975 Constitutional Convention had distinguished between the two 
categories - he argued that while custom changes, tradition remains invariant 
- and that is why only 'tradition' appears in the original constitution. Others 
denied this, arguing that the two terms are and have been used interchangeably. 28 
Ultimately the Yapese themselves, in the course of the committee' s  delibera­
tions , decided that because traditions and customs change and because people 
disagree about them, they are best left outside the law, which in the contempo­
rary FSM tends to be largely defined by American notions of precedent and 
invariance. In concluding the committee's  discussion, one of Pohnpei' s  del­
egates, Justice Johnny of the State Supreme Court, argued that in the absence of 
procedures and examples too specific to be spelled out in the constitution, the 
end result of any change would merely be more of the same: decisions on matters 
of custom and tradition would be left to the discretion of the courts - that is, 
the American judges on the FSM Supreme Court. 
The major sticking point was the question of whether any formal, constitu­
tional statement about custom would in fact threaten custom by both enshrining 
- and thereby freezing - it and forcing it into a context in which its character 
might have to be adjudicated: this would merely enhance the courts growing 
influence over questions of custom and thereby bring about precisely the 
opposite of what the committee intended, namely, protecting local practices 
from the oversight of the national government. Underlying this more obvious 
point, was a general sentiment that the states are in fact significantly different 
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and that the national government is neither able nor inclined to protect the 
differences among them; the only certain protection for local ethnic differences, 
delegates seemed to agree, lay in keeping responsibility for them out of the 
hands of the central government. 
Though a majority of the committee members finally approved the revised 
text and agreed to send it on to the ConCon itself, two delegates were profoundly 
disturbed by the proposal' s  implications and filed minority reports challenging 
the committee report's conclusions. Judge Johnny explored at length what he 
thought were the shortcomings in the proposed amendment. He argued that 
customs are inherently local , that there are no national customs, and that 
customs must therefore not be placed in a position where either the FSM 
president or courts might have an opportunity to tamper with them. 
By requiring that the President never infringe, restrict, suspend or 
impair any customary right during times of national emergencies, the 
proposal requires that these rights be formally identified and set down. 
This very process could erode those rights . For what may have previ­
ously been understood as customary rights, secure in the context of the 
daily lives of our people, may be transformed through being reduced to 
understandable explanations. The very setting down of these various 
rights may alter them, or cause them to be misunderstood (Standing 
Comm. Rept. I 0). 
Judge Johnny foresaw that local ethnic differences - customs and tradi­
tions - would be threatened by attempts to place them within the purview of 
the national government. In other words, his opposition to the committee report 
represented an even greater commitment to the protection oflocal prerogatives 
than that spelled out in the revised proposal, which had, after all, been 
thoroughly modified in order to guarantee exactly the same protections. 
When the proposal went before the ConCon's plenary it received only 1 5  
of the necessary 24 votes, with the opposing votes coming from Chuuk and 
Pohnpei. Defeat of a proposal extending constitutional protections to local 
customs might appear at first glance as a threat to customary rights, but it was 
in fact an affirmation of one of the more significant themes running through the 
entire fabric of the Con Con: thefear that anything formalizing the role of custom 
and/or tradition would eventually come to threaten it. The delegates largely 
agreed that local prerogatives had to be defended against the encroachments of 
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the national government, but they recognized a more general problem as well: 
to define a thing is to gain power over it. 
The continuing strength of Micronesian traditions is grounded in the fact 
that they remain traditions - they have not been transmuted into laws. This is, 
of course, part of a problem shared by most of the other multi-ethnic Pacific 
island nation-states and by most nation-states in general. The demands of the 
state itself -for formal, written, institutionalized laws - serve to destroy local 
initiative and independence. In attempts to provide equal protection for all, 
everyone is deprived of the protections of their own communal lifeways. This 
point, articulated by Johann Gottfried von Herder in the eighteenth century, 
remains as relevant today as it did two centuries ago. 
Kosrae - protecting religion 
Certainly the most interesting of Kosrae's  proposals was its attempt to rewrite 
the constitution's  freedom of religion clause. Ironically, it provides us with 
one of the best examples of how central ethnic concerns were to the ConCon. 
The Kosraen delegates repeatedly argued that Kosrae no longer has 
Micronesian customs or traditions, particularly in framing their opposition to 
the proposed Chamber of Chiefs (see below). But when it came time to press 
for an amendment of singular importance to them, they fully understood that 
the most compelling argument one can make in modem Micronesia is to make 
claims in the name of custom. All of the ConCon's  emphasis on decentrali­
zation, local autonomy, and sovereignty came from a deeply felt sense of 
ethnic differences and the need to preserve them. Thus the Kosraens took the 
position throughout the Civil Liberties and Tradition Committee' s  delibera­
tions that theirs is a distinct society with a distinctly different way of life, that 
their way of life was clearly being threatened because of the Micronesian 
constitution' s religious freedom clause, and that this distinct way of life could 
only be protected and preserved by a change in the constitution. Though many 
of Kosrae 's positions at the ConCon might be dismissed as simple manifesta­
tions of political and economic interest, in their attempt to gain the right to 
decide religious questions on their own island they were pursuing a course 
that did not particularly concern relations with other islands or with the 
national government. They truly sought to protect their culture and in doing so 
they help us see how the other states pursued similar courses. 
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The FSM constitution' s  freedom of religion article (IV, Sect. 2) reads, 'No 
law may be passed restricting an establishment of religion or restricting the free 
exercise of religion' .  Kosrae' s proposal inserted 'by the national government of 
the Federated S tates of Micronesia' after the phrase 'No law may be passed' . 
This would have allowed the states to place limits on religious freedom. 
At the public hearings on the proposal, it predictably provoked the wrath of 
nearly all the FSM' s expatriate legal advisers even as it evoked considerable 
support among the delegates themselves. The attorney general ' s  representative 
cited religious activities he thought were reasonably restricted, such as bigamy 
and human sacrifice, and the kinds of inappropriate restrictions that might result 
from the establishment of religion, such as forcing people to go to church or 
prohibiting marriage outside one's religion. He also argued that the 'world 
community' has been taking a closer look at incidences of 'religious repression' .  
The Micronesian Legal Services Corporation representative called the proposal 
'a  great step backwards for the FSM'.  She argued that it violated the ' most basic 
human right' ,  telling people what to believe, and then suggested that the 
Micronesian islands themselves might have been first populated by people 
fleeing religious persecution. 
One of the Kosraen representatives explained that they had indeed expected 
strong reactions to their proposal. But, he continued, it would be necessary to 
live for a long time in Kosrae - that is, to become thoroughly acquainted with 
the culture - in order to understand their position. Another Kosraen observed 
that he had been hearing a great deal of talk about custom and tradition, and the 
need to preserve them, but because Kosrae is ' a  small island' it tended to be 
ignored. 
When the committee met to decide the disposition of the proposed amend­
ment, all four Kosraen delegates were present, and each discussed the problem 
in explicitly cultural terms. It was perhaps the most concerted lobbying effort 
of the ConCon. Governor George, one of the ConCon' s most articulate and 
forceful speakers, began: 
Religion on Kosrae has become custom and tradition. It is not to be 
understood as the Western concept of religion. When the missionaries 
came to Kosrae they did a very good job - they completely replaced 
the old traditional ways. 
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Another added that the 'last King of Kosrae' became a pastor and in 1 948 
'declared an end to traditions '. 
Continuing with this deeply cultural analysis, one of the Kosraens explained 
that in Kosrae, 
you're born into a society that's already made a decision about its 
religion. Individuals don't make their own decisions. I realize this is 
completely foreign to Westerners, but we don' t  think our children 
should make religious decisions - they 've already been made. 
Kosrae recognizes freedom of religion in the US Constitution. If not for 
that, our religion would not have come to Kosrae. But if we look at this 
in the context of custom and tradition, our attempt is not to impair 
belief but to respect custom and tradition. 
Another of the Kosraens went on, 
The states are asking to transfer power to the states. Everyone wants 
more power to the states. Kosrae is the smallest. We talk about custom 
and tradition here. Well, religion is our custom and tradition. In all 
fairness, Kosrae has experienced all these problems because we're so 
small that whatever is introduced into the island affects everyone. 
Repeatedly, the Kosraens stressed that they were not out to 'dictate' anyone' s  
beliefs .  Rather, they insisted, they wanted only to check certain actions that 
were disrupting the island's  'peace and harmony' .  Their quarrel was with the 
sects that had been recently seeking to establish themselves on Kosrae, par­
ticularly Seventh Day Adventists and Baha'is. 'Any new religion coming in 
creates problems. They break up our families, causing social problems. Often 
Kosraens who join these new religions are almost excommunicated; they are 
no longer part of our community; they are outcasts from the community ' .  The 
Kosraens went on to cite specific incidents of wood-chopping and loud radio­
pla ying during church services and the general problem of working on Sun­
days as examples of the kinds of behaviour they wanted to prohibit, actions 
currently protected by the constitution's  freedom of religion clause. Some of 
the new religions, they claimed, even discourage people from voting. 
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A lengthy discussion ensued, exploring epistemological distinctions be­
tween actions and beliefs, and possible ways of discriminating among them, 
with an eye to controlling the former but not the latter. In the absence of the 
expatriate advisers who opposed limits on religion, the Micronesian delegates 
themselves spoke sympathetically of the problem.29 Nearly all of them cited 
examples of similar problems deriving from recent missionary activities on their 
own islands. Their empathy translated into enough committee support to get the 
proposal approved and sent on to the ConCon, where, after brief discussion, it 
was returned to committee and then dropped. The Kosraens had not expected to 
see their proposal go on the final referendum ballot. But in arguing convincingly 
enough to have it sent on to the ConCon as a committee proposal they certainly 
succeeded in discharging their obligation to the people who had sent them to the 
convention. 
It is worth analyzing the Kosraen delegates' success in committee, where 
a simple majority was enough to report out a proposal favourably. Though they 
could not duplicate this at the plenary, where three or four votes against a 
proposal were usually enough to defeat it, their initial accomplishment is 
evidence of the deep concern nearly all the delegates had for issues of custom 
and tradition. Throughout the ConCon, the Kosraens had been stressing the 
issue of states rights. They did so in this case as well, referring several times to 
their state' s small size and its consequent need for particular protection. During 
the lengthy debates over establishment of a national Chamber of Chiefs, the 
Kosraens had repeatedly taken a nearly opposite tack, stressing that their society 
has no ' traditional leaders' ,  and they vigorously opposed the measure for 
precisely this reason. They discussed in detail the reasons why their own leaders 
would not be comfortable - indeed, would be at an disadvantage - dealing 
with the other states in such a chamber. In that context, they claimed that they 
no longer had a particular custom or culture to protect; they were in fact claiming 
that their cultural differences from the others provided a legitimate reason for 
opposing a proposal supported by most other delegates. 
Given the Kosraens' commitment to consensus they felt they had to provide 
a reason for their opposition to a measure the others were willing to support. But 
when it became clear that custom provided the surest means of persuading the 
others to go along with restrictions on religious freedoms, the Kosraens had no 
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doubts about the primacy of their customs and the propriety of protecting them 
through appeals to culture.30 
Chuuk -protecting population 
The first proposal Chuuk submitted was perhaps the most predictable. It 
called for the distribution of foreign financial assistance to the states 'based 
upon their population on a fair and equitable basis' (Del. Prop. 23). This 
language was considered overly vague and was amended in a second proposal 
(Del. Prop . 66), submitted by the Pohnpei delegation. The Pohnpeians' pro­
posal, after setting the national government's share at 20 per cent, specified 
that 'the state governments shall share the remaining 80 per cent on the basis 
of population'. Article XII, Section 2 of the current constitution specifies that 
'each state shall receive a share equal to the share of the national government 
and to the share of every other state'. As Governor George of Kosrae observed 
at the outset of the ConCon, this principle has not been put into practice, and, 
he continued, it is a sign of Kosrae' s goodwill toward its 'sister states' that it 
has not protested the departure from the constitutional mandate. These two 
proposals struck, of course, directly at the heart of the rift between Kosrae, 
self-consciously the smallest state, and Chuuk, which was for the most part 
trying to play down the fact that it comprises more than half of the FSM's 
people. The issue was among the most problematic the ConCon had to face, 
given that nearly all the FSM's operating funds come from foreign (primarily 
American) sources. 
Despite (or, more likely, because of) its considerable significance, the 
Chuuk proposal received little public attention beyond that of the Pohnpei 
delegation's intervention. The Pohnpeians' revised version was similarly ig­
nored. The head of the FSM's Resources and Development Department, 
responding to the posted agenda of a public hearing at which he was testifying, 
took the issue up briefly, arguing in general that the proposed change would 
harm the smaller states and more specifically that the policy would serve to 
promote overpopulation. Anything that encourages population increase, he 
suggested, is 'not in the best interests of the nation'. Several delegates referred 
tangentially to the issue in other contexts, including a hearing on the proposal 
prohibiting abortion and one on the rights of states to impose travel restrictions 
upon the people of other states - in both cases the proposal was raised in 
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relation to population control issues - but the matter was otherwise publicly 
ignored. 
Chuuk State, with a 1 990 population of 55,000, has slightly more than 5 1  
per cent of FSM population; Pohnpei State, with 33,263 people, has nearly a 
third of the FSM'  s population. Together, these two states comprise 83 per cent 
of the nation' s people. Kosrae, on the other hand, has a population of 7 ,390, only 
7 per cent of the total. Based on the revised formula put forward by the Chuuk 
and Pohnpei delegations , Chuuk would receive more than 7 dollars for every 
dollar that came to Kosrae. It was Kosraen apprehensions about a proposal of 
precisely this sort that had provoked its spirited resistance to the change in the 
Con Con' s  consensus rule. 
The plan for a new distribution of foreign aid funds marks one of the few 
points on which the Chuukese and Pohnpeian delegations agreed. B etween the 
two, however, they had only 22 of the ConCon's 3 1  delegates , that is , 7 1  per 
cent of the votes, and not the 83 per cent that a popular vote would have given 
them. They fell two votes short of the 24 votes needed to pass proposals on first 
reading. NoneofYap's orKosrae' s  delegates were likely to votefortheproposal 
on first reading, nor would ei therof these delegations have given it the third vote 
necessary for passage on second reading. There was simply no chance for the 
proposal to succeed and any discussion of it would have served only to 
antagonize Kosrae and Yap. Despite its significance, then, it was a dead issue. 
A second key proposal the Chuukese delegation introduced was its attempt 
to institute a popular election for the FSM presidency and vice-presidency (Del. 
Prop. 44). The proposal called for a simple majority vote of all the FSM's 
qualified voters. As explained earlier, Micronesians in general are dissatisfied 
with the present electoral system, in which the FSM Congress elects the 
president from among the four at-large senators. Although there had been an 
understanding tl1at the position would be rotated among the four states, and that 
after Tosi wo Nakayama, the first FSM president, had finished his two terms the 
position would go to Pohnpei, Chuukese domination of Congress had resulted 
in Pohnpei 's being passed over in 1 987; the Yapese senator, widely considered 
rather young for the job, was selected for the position.31 The widespread dis­
content had resulted in the submission of thirteen proposals modifying the 
electoral system. The fact that the Chuuk delegation as a whole submitted a 
proposal, then, was not remarkable. Its proposal for a popular vote, to be 
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determined by a simple majority, however, was dismissed out of hand by the rest 
of the ConCon. 
As had happened when Chuuk proposed dividing foreign aid money on a per 
capita basis, most of the other delegations saw it pursuing a course not merely 
in its own interests but running squarely against theirs. Though Pohnpei stood 
to gain by supporting the former proposal, even it could not afford to support the 
latter: with more than half of the nation's entire population residing in Chuuk 
State, this proposal would have enabled the Chuukese to select one of their own 
as FSM president in every election. And even though the sheer size of Chuuk 
State's  population results in repeated fissioning and factionalization within the 
state, Chuukese politicians have proven themselves skilful coalition-builders 
who have been able to overcome their differences effectively enough to control 
the Congress. 
Pohnpei -protecting land 
Three of the key proposals Pohnpei unsuccessfully brought forward either 
paralleled or duplicated proposals introduced by other delegations. Its attempt 
to require state approval for the storage or transit of nuclear and other toxic 
materials (Del. Prop. 6) was subsumed by Yap's more sweeping attempt to 
prohibit entirely the entry of these materials into the FSM (Del. Prop. 3 1 )  as 
discussed above. It proposed changes (Del. Prop. 17) intended to redefine the 
governmental powers held concurrently by the states and the federal govern­
ment (shifting away from the congressional powers over import and income 
taxes and major crimes); these were overshadowed by Yap's much more 
comprehensive proposal (Del. Prop. 58) for an entirely new constitutional 
article expressly detailing the powers reserved to the states. And its proposal 
(Del. Prop. 66) for distribution of foreign aid on a per capita basis was 
essentially the same as Chuuk's (Del . Prop. 23). 
Three other defeated proposals also lay close to the heart of Pohnpei 's goals 
at the ConCon: the right of states to secede from the FSM (Del. Prop. 66), an item 
examined above; state control over migration within the FSM, i.e., the right to 
prohibit the inmgration of other FSM citizens (Del. Prop. 20) ;  and assigning to 
state courts exclusive juristiction over land issues (Del. Prop. 1 8). 
The latter two issues were part of a nexus of concerns that posed real 
dilemmas for the delegates. Pohnpei is the largest island in the FSM and seat of 
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the national capital. It has historically been a site that attracts inmigrants, some 
belligerent, others less so. Much of its mythology is concerned with the doings 
of outsiders drawn to its shores (Petersen 1990). Following the Sokehs Rebel­
lion of 1910 the Germans began a program of resettling outer-islanders (from 
the nearby atolls and from the Mortlocks group in what is now Chuuk State) on 
the lands of the exiled rebels. During the Japanese era, thousands of Japanese 
subjects were settled on the island, outnumbering the native Pohnpeians and 
nearly displacing them. The US administration actively promoted homestead­
ing on Pohnpei by the outer-islanders. Currently the FSM capital, with its large 
numbers of legislators, bureaucrats, technicians, and functionaries from other 
parts of Micronesia, along with a number of expatriate Americans, Filipinos, 
Japanese, and sojourners from other parts of the former Trust Territory, is 
spawning yet another wave of inmigration. Pohnpeians are troubled by the trend 
and it was this that prompted them to propose amendments that would allow 
states to deny land to other FSM citizens, to deny the FSM Supreme Court 
juristictioo over land cases, to control the inmigratioo (and generally restrict any 
entry) of their fellow FSM citizens, and to require state concurrence in the 
naturalization of non-Micronesians and the entry of those holding work permits 
approved by other states.32 
Though these issues were of paramount importance to a large number of 
Pohnpeians, they were perceived as profoundly threatening by others at the 
ConCon, particularly the delegates from Chuuk, who were aware of Pohnpeian . 
misgivings about the growing Chuukese population in general, the numbers of 
Chuukese working for the national government on Pohnpei, and the influence 
of the Chuukese congressional delegation.33 The Civil Liberties and Tradition 
Committee's discussion of the proposal to accord states the right to place 
restrictions on travel and immigration (Del. Prop. 20) turned on the wording 
'reasonable restriction'. The proposal immediate! y provoked troubled reactions 
from the other delegations and some of the legal advisers. While one Pohnpeian 
delegate explained that the proposal was a response to the shared experience of 
problems caused by people unfamiliar with a society's customs, and the need to 
rectify this, several Chuukese saw it as having the potential to violate the basic 
principle of equal protection before the law. One of them went so far as to 
suggest that if such a programme were pushed far enough it might produce 
different social classes and institutionalize forms of discrimination. 
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Several legal advisers raised the question of whether such an amendment 
would enable Pohnpeians to restrict the entry onto Pohnpei island not only of 
Chuukese but also the people of the adjacent coral atolls. They made repeated 
reference to the possibility that Pohnpeians would prevent fellow FSM citizens 
from gaining access to the national capital, thereby threatening their freedom to 
assemble. One went so far as to ask if the proposed amendment would allow 
states to keep their own citizens from leaving, and another asked if it could be 
used to evict people 'who already live here' (on Pohnpei). In response, one of 
the Pohnpeians cited the current constitution's clause making the protection of 
tradition a matter of 'compelling social purpose' , but to little avail. 
The proposal was discussed almost entirely in terms of what the Pohnpeians 
might do- not in terms of theoretical abstractions - and it was clear that many 
feared the proposal, even those who sympathized with the Pohnpeians' general 
desire to wrest control of their island away from the national government, and 
so its context was gracefully shifted. Delegates and staff agreed that states 
already possessed the right to control inmigration and travel for emergency 
purposes, as was done during cholera outbreaks on Chuuk, for example. This 
then enabled the committee to conclude that because the states can do these 
things now, there was no need for an amendment. Given the overall tenor of the 
debate, it appears that most of the delegates and their staff did not believe that 
the states could restrict travel and immigration, but the nature of discussions in 
committee meetings generally precluded confrontation - the Pohnpeians saw 
that they were not going to win a vote and they did not call for one. 34 
In raising the issue of Pohnpei 's ability to keep outer-islanders from within 
the state itself off the main island, the committee touched tangentially upon one 
of the more fundamental problems facing the Pohnpei delegation. Several of its 
members, though long-time residents of Pohnpei proper, are of outer-island 
origins. Outer-islanders on Pohnpei are in general wary of Pohnpeian attitudes 
toward them, fearing that without the leavening heterogeneity of the FSM as a 
whole, ethnic Pohnpeians might pursue underlying 'Pohnpei for Pohnpeians' 
sentiments to the point of discriminating against the atoll peoples. Despite this 
significant difference in outlook within their delegation, the Pohnpeian del­
egates pursued a course largely charted by the wishes of the ethnic Pohnpeians: 
they sought resolutely to seize control from the FSM government and place it 
in Pohnpeian hands. 
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The Pohnpeians ' Delegate Proposal No. 7 stated that the right of an FSM 
citizen 'to acquire and own land within any state oftheFSM shall be as decribed 
in the respective state' s  constitution' .  This was to be added to the clause of the 
1 975 Constitution prohibiting non-citizens from acquring title to land. The 
original constitution says nothing about state control over land, as indeed it says 
very little about states' rights to exercise authority in general. In the context of 
the amendments Pohnpei was proposing, this proposal, too, was seen as 
something a threat. In testifying on behalf of it, Edwel Santos, chief justice of 
Pohnpei State' s Supreme Court, acknowledged that some might perceive it as 
a threat to basic civil rights. But, he asked, 'Are we to apply a declaration of 
rights based on a foreign way of living? Then we are not building a way that 
reflects the Micronesian way of living or Micronesian traditions' .  Santos 
underscored the fact that this was a proposal the Pohnpei people had come 
together and agreed upon, and asked the committee to approve it on the 
Pohnpeians '  behalf. 'I pray that God will enlighten you to see that this is a 
proposal Pohnpei wants. Whether you accept this or not is up to you' . In an aside, 
the committee chairman, a Chuukese, said that if Pohnpei were to institute such 
restrictions, so would Chuuk. Santos responded, 'It's up to the will of the 
majority of Chuukese whether this will pass. Chuuk's  Legistat.ure could pass 
legislation to compensate' . 
This exchange demonstrates that Pohnpei brought some of its proposals 
forward in explicitly localized terms; this item was not being advanced as 
something for the good of all Micronesians. As the Kosraens did when they 
argued for their establishment of religion clause, the Pohnpeians acknowledged 
that the right of states to control access to land was something they desired on 
their own behalf. In doing so, however, they also evidenced a highly typical 
aspect of Pohnpeian respect for individual autonomy. Santos's  comment that 
'Whether you accept this or not is up to you' , is characteristic of Pohnpeian 
interpersonal relations : Pohnpeians tend to a void telling others what they should 
or should not do. 
As happened in other cases, and as Chief Justice Santos had predicted, some 
Civil Liberties and Tradition Committee members raised the question of basic 
rights. 'Aren't  we taking away the right to give away land?' , asked a Chuukese. 
Indeed, all of the Chuuk delegates on the committee were troubled by the 
possibility that marriages between Pohnpeians and Chuukese could not be 
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accompanied by gifts of land, a customary exchange fundamental to Chuukese 
culture. Yapese, on the other hand, seemed to rest secure in the knowledge that 
their state' s constitution explicitly prohibits acquisition of land in any but the 
traditional manner - through inheritance. One of the Kosraean delegates 
observed that non-Micronesians get around Kosrae's attempts to keep them 
from acquiring land by marrying Kosraens, having children, and then making 
purchases in their names. The issue of control over land was very much on 
everyone's minds, but only Pohnpei seemed to think it an issue of paramount 
importance. Despite their attempts to convince the others that Micronesians 
would be free to acquire 'life estate ' - that is, they could obtain land for their 
own use, but could not purchase it in 'fee simple' and thus pass it on to their 
descendants - Pohnpei' s delegates did not prevail. 
The importance Pohnpei gave to the issue is manifest in the efforts it 
undertook to have the proposal approved by the ConCon. In the final two days, 
when the delegates were working feverishly to decide upon nearly every 
measure, Pohnpei 's land proposal was voted on four times - that is, after it was 
initially defeated on first reading it was recalled three more times. On each 
occasion it received only 20 or 21 votes, falling short of the 24 votes necessary 
for passage. Opposition to the measure came from Chuukese and Kosraean 
delegates, some of whom shifted their votes on successive rounds. Despite 
attempts to have the matter clarified by the legal staff and much discussion 
among delegates during the brief recesses that accompanied each new attempt, 
the Pohnpeians were unable to gamer the votes they needed. Judah Johnny, head 
of the Pohnpei delegation, spoke of outer-islanders who have come to Pohnpei: 
some have adopted Pohnpeian ways, others have not. Pohnpeians are not so 
much concerned about where people come from as they are about the willing­
ness of outsiders to take on Pohnpeian ways, he said, explaining that this 
measure grew out of Pohnpeians' ' insecurities' about those who do not 
acculturate. 
As in most of the Pacific, and perhaps in most agriculturally-oriented 
societies, land on Pohnpei is not merely a source of livelihood. It serves as an 
enormously powerful, universally salient symbol of life and society. But on 
Pohnpei , unlike Chuuk and Yap, where there are traditional patterns of incor­
porating outer-islanders into social relations, or Kosrae, which for geographical 
reasons has no outer-islands communities within its state, people face continued 
inmigration without traditionally sanctioned means of reconciling it to the 
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extant culture. The nexus of travel, inmigration, secession, and land issues lay, 
as I have stressed, at the core of Pohnpei' s interests at the ConCon, and these 
interests were clearly manifested in the repeated attempts to pass the measure. 
Along with the secession issue, its failure underlined the basis of Pohnpei' s 
discontent with the FSM's constitutional processes. 
Pohnpei ' s insistence on controlling its own land was tenacious. Although 
it had been unable to persuade the ConCon to approve its proposed amendment 
regarding the right of states (via their constitutions) to limit the access rights of 
Micronesians from other states, it ultimately managed to wrest most land issues 
away from the national government and courts. Just barely, however. 
Pohnpei'  s delegation introduced two proposals intended to shift cases 
concerning land away from the FSM Supreme Court and have them instead 
adjudicated entirely in the state courts. The first of these dealt with diversity 
cases (Del. Prop. 5); this declared that cases involving parties from different 
political entities, whether FSM states or nations, would be the province of state 
courts rather than the FSM Supreme Court. The second explicitly excluded 
national courts from cases in which 'an interest in land is at issue' (Del. Prop. 
1 8). Because the two were introduced by the same delegation and meant to 
address the same general problems, they were soon merged together in commit­
tee, and this conjunction nearly resulted in defeat for both of them. In the end, 
the bid to exclude the national court from land cases was approved by the 
ConCon only afterithad been accorded a special status: it became the ConCon' s 
one and only 'Convention Proposal ' when it was at the last moment called by 
the plenary out of committee, where it had been tabled, and then favourably 
voted upon. 
In fact, in an initial series of hearings and meetings, the proposals met with 
only minor opposition, most of it coming from the Supreme Court's chief 
justice, whose arguments in his decision in Bank of Guam v. Semes (3 FSM 
Interm. 370, 380-84) were cited by the Pohnpeians as evidence of the pressing 
need for the change they were proposing. Judge King had noted in this case that 
the Journal of the 1975 Constitutional Convention contained much explicit 
evidence that the delegates had intended for all land cases to be dealt with by the 
respective states. He cited, for instance, the report's conclusion that 
The consensus of your Joint Committee on Functions and Structure is 
that where ownership or interest in land is concerned, this is purely a 
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district [i.e, an FSM state] matter and it is under the juristiction of that 
district. The national level of our future government will not have 
juristiction over land matters (ibid.) .  
The framers ' views notwithstanding, Judge King held that because the article 
on juristiction (Art. XI Sect. 6(b) does not explicitly exclude the national court 
from hearing cases in which land is at issue, the court is therefore charged with 
adjudicating them. 
Pohnpei introduced the two items as alternative means of wresting control 
of local matters from the national government. There were, however, just 
enough reservations about the likelihood that a Micronesian from one state 
would receive a fair hearing in another- that is, for state juristiction in diversity 
cases - to dampen enthusiasm for the state courts ' prerogatives in land matters. 
With the two issues combined in a single committee proposal, the proceedings 
bogged down. The head of Pohnpei 's delegation, Judge Johnny, was the 
proposal 's  prime mover; he was intimately familiar with the issues and repeat­
edly cited a body of case law in which the FSM court was consistently 
adjudicating local land matters. He insisted that land was of far too much value 
to the people of Pohnpei to allow the national court - that is, non-Pohnpeians 
- to deal with it. 
As the committee members worked on this complex issue, some recognized 
that its complexity derived largely from the fact that two distinct issues had been 
merged together. The Pohnpeian point of view, however, seemed to be that the 
only way to assure state control over land cases was to make doubly sure by 
drafting a two-pronged amendment, with one tine providing general protections 
(diversity) and the other aimed at more specific issues. Several delegates 
observed that the problem was partly rooted in misunderstandings on the part of 
the FSM Court's American judges, who thought that differences between FSM 
states were of the same order as differences between states in the United States. 
This is most certainly not the case. Differences between Micronesian cultures, 
as these delegates observed, are of much greater depth and significance and, as 
we have seen, lay behind many, if not most, of the problems the ConCon 
encountered. 
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The Committee finally wound up with two drafts of a committee proposal, 
one emphasizing diversity, the other land. They worked back and forth between 
the two, trying to find phrasing that would state precisely what they wanted. The 
problem, however, was they were not entire! y sure what they wanted, given the 
underlying apprehensions about the diversity clause. In their penultimate 
meeting they had essentially decided upon a draft guaranteeing that land cases 
would be dealt with by state courts when one of the delegates asked to delay the 
committee' s  vote, arguing that a little more technical legal advice was called for. 
When the committee reconvened on the morning of the Con Con's last day they 
were preoccupied by the questions of a bicameral Congress and direct presiden­
tial elections. Only seven of the twelve members were present and because 
seven votes were required to report a proposal favourably out of committee, it 
was effectively killed. The committee took up the topic briefly, but in the 
absence of its main advocates, it voted to table the proposal . 
Just as the final session of the Plenary was about to begin, the Pohnpei 
delegation met to discuss this state of affairs . Judge Johnny - head of the 
delegation - was consumed with bringing the land issue to a successful 
conclusion. It was of critical importance to the Pohnpei delegates, who for a 
variety of reasons felt they needed to demonstrate to their people that they had 
won at least a few of the mandated changes (they had not met with much success 
thus far). Shortly after the plenary was called to order, he asked to have the 
diversity proposal (Del. Prop. 5) called out of committee and considered by the 
plenary. His motion met with no opposition and the proposal was taken under 
consideration. He then introduced an amendment to it, which recast it as the land 
juristiction proposal he had also introduced (Del. Prop. 1 8). This explicitly 
excluded national courts from 'juristiction in cases where an interest in land is 
at issue' . There were short recesses as the Pohnpeians attended to minor 
objections from several other delegates, changing a few phrasings to suit them, 
and then the plenary voted unanimously to approve the measure as Convention 
Proposal No. 1 .  What appears to have been a rather extraordinary measure was 
in fact a fairly simple one that had already been agreed upon and was held up 
largely because of mistakes made in committee by insufficiently organized 
delegates. 
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The Proposals III - some shared problems 
Full faith and credit 
I turn now to two amendments that cannot usefully be identified with particu­
lar states, the first because three different delegate proposals with nearly 
identical language were introduced, and the second because Chuuk, the state 
that introduced it, was least engaged in the debate over it. 'Full faith and 
credit' was popular enough to have been submitted in three different delegate 
proposals (Del. Props. 19 [Pohnpei], 55 [Yap] , 60 [Chuuk]). The language in 
each was lifted directly from Article IV, Section 1 of the US constitution, the 
only difference among the three lying in how much of the American article 
was borrowed. The wording of the first, introduced by the Pohnpei delegation, 
which contained most of the language adopted in the final draft approved by 
the plenary, specified that 'Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to 
the public acts , records, and judicial proceedings of every other state ' , and 
went on to charge Congress with prescribing the means of implementing the 
measure. 
In introducing the committee proposal (Com. Prop. 6), its importance for 
promoting unity among the states was stressed. 
The clause in the United States, and as proposed for inclusion in the 
Constitution of the Federated S tates of Micronesia, is intended to be a 
unifying force among the states and between the states and the national 
government (Standing Comm. Rept. 1 3 :2). 
It might be argued, however, that this was not all that lay behind it. The 
measure can also be interpreted as a yet another attempt to promote state 
equality, one of the ConCon's most pervasive themes. The proposal in effect 
instructed each state to respect the acts of the others. While noting that in 
general 'local policy will not override the full faith and credit clause' ,  the 
Committee Report specified exceptions to the general rule, allowing a court 
'to balance its state's interests in the policy against the interests' of another 
state (ibid. :3). It then went on to specify, for the record, that its use of the US 
constitution' s  language did not necessarily mean that American case law was 
relevant in Micronesia (indeed, Del. Prop. 42 and Com. Prop. 19 were drafted 
specifically to keep the FSM Supreme Court from grounding decisions in US 
law when there were relevant Micronesian precedents). 
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The states of the United States are relatively homogenous. In contrast, 
the states of the FSM have different languages, customs, laws, consti­
tutions, and court systems. These differences must be kept in mind in 
the interpretation of this clause (ibid. ). 
S ome delegates worried that the proposal still threatened to erode 'local 
customs and traditions' ,  in situations where the laws of other states might 
conflict with local practices (Government Structure and Function Comittee 
Summary Minutes, 1 4  August 1990). The committee included even more 
detailed instructions, adding that 'Micronesian customs and traditions and the 
social and geographical configuration of the FSM might in a given case 
provide reasons for a court to take a path different from U.S. case law' 
(Standing Comm. Rept. 1 3 :3).  
Even while claiming that the proposal was intended to promote unity, then, 
the ConCon was still preoccupied with emphasizing differences among the 
states, arguing that these were substantial enough to warrant a very different 
interpretation of the American precedent ostensibly being copied. Indeed the 
only stumbling block that arose in committee was resolved by a key change in 
wording from the American original, which speaks of 'public acts ' ;  this was 
rewritten in the Micronesian version as 'statutes' in order to avoid including 
state constitutions : 'Due to concerns about state sovereignty, such constitutions 
were not to be encompassed by the proposal ' (Government Structure and 
Functions Committee Summary Minutes, 14  August 1990) . Having thus assured 
the states that they were, on the one hand, to be treated as equals and, on the other, 
would not be forced to conform with the examples of their equals, the proposal 
sailed through the plenary. It received no discussion and was approved unani­
mously on first reading. 
The Chamber of Chiefs 
In 1 975 questions about the official status of traditional leaders - and a 
formal role in government for them - had nearly brought the Constitutional 
Convention to a halt (Meller 1985 :261 -286). The debate' s  final outcome 
produced a compromise in which Article V, Section 3 specified that 'the 
Congress may establish, when needed, a Chamber of Chiefs ' .  The matter 
remained a sensitive one; in contrast with most other issues taken up by the 
1 990 ConCon, the delegations had given the Chamber of Chiefs issue a good 
deal of thought before they arrived. During the planning meetings that pre-
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ceded the Convention, Yap - having long maintained that its customs were 
not the province of the national government - proposed removing Article 
V's Section 3 entirely from the constitution. 35 Kosrae strongly opposed any 
elevation of chieftainship to a formal status within the government. As the 
Kosraens pointed out insistently, they no longer had any 'traditional leaders' .  
Pohnpei and Chuuk evidenced more ambivalence. Some Pohnpeian del­
egates maintained that their delegation had been charged with pushing for the 
establishment of a Chamber of Chiefs, while others pointed out that the 
delegation had decided to refrain from submitting a proposal to this end. Though 
traditional chieftainship provides a central organizing structure for the lives of 
ethnic Pohnpeians, it is less significant among most of Pohnpei State's outer­
island societies, and the role of Pohnpeian chiefs remains a thorny issue within 
Pohnpei S tate. 
Even more tom were the Chuukese. The proposal for a Chamber of Chiefs 
(Del. Prop. 24) was introduced by eight of Chuuk' s thirteen delegates. In itself, 
this was not unusual : the full delegation submitted only a handful of proposals . 
However, the first state constitution drafted in Chuuk was defeated by voters 
largely because it provided for a state chamber of chiefs. It had to be rewritten 
without this provision before it was approved. The character of traditional 
leadership in Chuuk is highly complex and the relative ranking of these leaders 
is continually contested: many Chuukese, it appears, felt that formalizing the 
role of their leaders would result in some ossification of their relative ranking, 
while it is the continuous contesting of rank that allows traditional political life 
to thrive in Chuuk.36 Even though it was a group of Chuukese who introduced 
the measure, the votes opposing it came largely from Chuuk - and in this the 
delegates ' ConCon behaviour mirrored the political situation at home. 
In sum, Kosrae and Yap were opposed to the proposed change, while Chuuk 
and Pohnpei were ambivalent. Given the degree of opposition to it, it is 
surprising that the proposal even reached the plenary. That it did is a good 
indicator of the chiefs ' continued influence in the FSM. Few delegates were 
willing to speak frankly about denying the chiefs a formal role if that is what the 
chiefs wanted. Undoubtedly a key factor in the proposal' s  success was the 
presence of Pohnpei 's  highly articulate Nahniken of Net (the 'talking chief' of 
one of Pohnpei 's five paramount chiefdoms), who served as vice-chairman of 
the Civil Liberties and Tradition Committee. The Nahniken's support for the 
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measure in committee counterbalanced the generally concerted opposition to it 
mounted by the Kosraen delegation. 
The proposal' s  progress was not smooth. When the plenary first took the 
measure up, unusually visible opposition to it immediately swfaced. This was 
relatively early in the course of the Con Con and the committee' s  leaders, lacking 
experience the group' s  internal dynamics, failed to have the proposal tabled 
while they gathered enough votes to ensure its passage. The measure was 
defeated on first reading. After sounding out the opposition, the committee 
arranged to have the proposal recalled and then offered amendments to it. 37 As 
it became clear that it still lacked adequate support, the proposal was deferred, 
taken up and deferred again, then taken up, amended, and finally passed by a 27-
1 vote. 
In keeping with their commitment to consensus, all but one of the Kosraens 
ultimately voted for the proposal, but they nonetheless mounted the most 
concerted opposition to it, arguing that they had no traditional leaders or chiefs 
and that if they did choose leaders to represent them in the Chamber of Chiefs, 
they would be at a distinct disadvantage. While recognizing the fundamental 
coherence of this argument, the others insisted that Kosrae did have leaders 
whose status derived largely from their positions in the church and that they 
were for all intents and purposes 'traditional ' .  Kosrae's delegates had argued at 
length that. Kosrae's religion was its 'custom' when they recognized that this 
was the most likely means of eliminating the constitutional prohibition against 
establishment of religion, and their colleagues were merely putting the same 
logic to work against them. 
Both the committee and the plenary grappled with questions about the very 
nature of chieftainship itself. Lying at the heart of the debate over the chamber 
was the matter of just how specific the proposal should be. Some argued that 
unless the ConCon spelled out exactly what the chamber was to do and how it 
was to be initially organized, Congress would implement the proposal in 
whatever fashion it chose, and that given Congress 's tendencies, it would be 
sure to maintain ultimate control over the chamber. In order to create a truly 
independent chamber, beholden to Congress for neither its finances nor struc­
ture, they argued, it was necessary to spell out the chamber's organization in 
great detail. On the other hand, many delegates - a significant majority of them, 
it appears - held that no one, not even the ConCon, could tell chiefs what to do. 
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They had to be able to organize themselves and determine their own functions. 
One delegate (a Chuukese ), in a remark that perhaps best captures the complex 
nature of traditional leadership roles in modern Micronesian societies, said, 
'The chiefs tell us what to do, and we tell them what to do' . This observation in 
fact reflects much of the underlying ambivalence about the Chamber of Chiefs. 
As Norman Meller (1985 :26 1 )  notes , at the 1975 Constitutional Convention 
Pohnpei 's Heinrich Iriarte upset a number of his fellow delegates by observing 
that 'Some of us are born to rule and some of us born to serve' .38 Iriarte, though 
an elected delegate, held a high-ranking traditional title and was the younger 
brother of Nahnmwarki Max Iriarte, one of Pohnpei ' s two traditional leaders 
participating in the convention. In 1 990 the Nahnmwarki ' s  son, Nahniken 
Salvador Iriarte, vice-chairman of the Civil Liberties and Tradition Committee, 
also spoke of those 'born to rule' .39 No matter how much Micronesians might 
respect their own chiefs - and those of other communities and islands - few 
are willing to grant them the power implicit in any claim that they are born to 
rule. 
The Pohnpeian nahniken nearly defeated his own cause as he was attempt­
ing to stress the importance chiefs retain in Pohnpeian society. Just as the 
plenary began reconsidering the proposal after its initial defeat, a middle-aged 
Pohnpeian, stripped to the waist and bearing a stalk of sugar cane over his right 
shoulder, entered the Convention' s  Chamber and strode purposefully onto the 
ConCon floor.4° ConCon President Moses called to the sergeant-at-anns to 
intercept him, but in seconds the man was crouching before the nahniken' s desk. 
The president quickly gavelled a recess as the man carefully placed the cane 
against his chief and began speaking in a quiet voice. A member of his family 
had died earlier that day and he was performing a luhke, the traditional request 
for his chief' s presence at the funeral. In a few minutes he departed and the cane 
was carried away. Later, there was disagreement among those present about the 
extraordinary timing of the luhke, coming as it did just as the nahniken was about 
to speak. Some argued that it had been deliberately arranged, while others said 
that this was not likely, given that the episode undoubtedly served to further 
alienate those already dubious about assigning the chiefs a formal role in 
government. In either case it was probably the ConCon' s  most dramatic 
moment. Following this interlude, the nahniken rose to begin speaking on behalf 
of the Chamber of Chiefs proposal. 41 He discussed the peace-keeping role chiefs 
traditionally play, emphasizing that they could promote harmony and unity 
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within the FSM, and that they were ready to serve the nation night and day in 
these capacities. His words were somewhat vague and contradictory: in the 
fashion of proper Pohnpeian oratory, he avoided any appearance of telling 
people what to do. 
There were still too many delegates with reservations about formally 
empowering the chiefs, and the measure was deferred again as more satisfactory 
wording was sought. Eventually, the ConCon's most influential delegates took 
charge of the proposal and worked skilfully to resolve resistance to it. This was 
the only occasion on which I saw parliamentary skills deliberately brought to 
bear as a means of solving an otherwise intractable problem -evidence of the 
proposal 's significance. They managed to draft phrasing that was simulta­
neously vague enough to assure that the chiefs themselves would be able to 
determine the chamber' s  official role, and specific enough to overcome fears 
that Congress would exercise power over it. By combining a numberof different 
amendments and drafts, they rewrote the Constitution's  Article V, Section 3 so 
that 'a chamber of chiefs is hereby established' .  Its primary role would be 'to 
advise on matters of customs and traditions, to promote and protect customs and 
traditions, and to promote peace and unity'.  The role of the national government 
-that is, the Congress - in establishing the chamber would be to 'take every 
step necessary and reasonable to provide' for the chamber's  operations. 
If the delegates were not prepared to gainsay the chiefs in the public arena 
of the Con Con, the Micronesian people were very much prepared to do so in the 
privacy of their ballots. The proposed change was defeated overwhelmingly in 
the constitutional referendum. It received the lowest number of favourable votes 
in Kosrae and Pohnpei, placed second to last in Yap and Chuuk, and received 
the lowest number of votes overall. Ironically, only in Kosrae, seat of the most 
articulate opposition to it, did the proposal receive more than 50 per cent 
approval (it got 55 per cent). In Pohnpei 48 per cent of the voters supported it, 
in Chuuk 39 per cent, and in Yap 34 per cent. 
This massive opposition to the Chamber of Chiefs is evidence not of 
chieftainship' s declining significance in Micronesia, .but of just the converse. 
The fact that in the traditional leaders ' presence the Con Con delegates could not 
bring themselves to gainsay them testifies to the nature of the dilemma. The 
chiefs retain tremendous influence, of various types and springing from mul­
tiple sources. In general, Micronesian polities rely on the strengths of their 
chiefs to guarantee certain defensive functions -in relation to both the exterior 
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and supernatural worlds - and people are thus inclined to support them. At the 
same time, however, they strongly resist any attempts on the part of the chiefs 
to interfere too much in the everyday, domestic sphere of community life. They 
accomplish these dual, contradictory tasks with dual - or tripartite -political 
structures in which various leaders, factions, and communities ceaselessly 
compete with one another and thus serve to check overweening ambition and 
unwarranted attempts to exercise power. 
As the entire thrust of the ConCon made clear, Micronesians have signifi­
cant doubts about the power of their national government, generally perceiving 
the Congress as entirely too strong. Permitting the chiefs to take on a formal role 
in the national government would not only have enhanced their power, but 
decreased the dual character of the present-day Micronesian scene, with 
Congress on the one hand and the traditional polities on the other. Keeping the 
chiefs out of government seems to have been a deliberate means of preserving 
both their role as protectors of the people and the traditional structures of 
competing power blocs. For all that the FSM constitution portrays itself as a 
guardian of Micronesian customs and traditions, the Micronesian people see 
their guarantees situated elsewhere, and aim to keep them there. It is only from 
this perspective, I think, that we can understand why it was that only in Kosrae, 
with no chiefs, a majority actually voted in favour of the Chamber of Chiefs, 
while in Yap, which most observers would agree has the most viable traditional 
polity and the only state government with an official role for chiefs already in 
place, the chamber received its greatest opposition. 
The problem of ratification 
I tum now to the final proposal submitted to the 1 990 ConCon, Delegate 
Proposal 104, forwarded to the plenary as Commitee Proposal 35. It had the 
potential for effecting greater changes in Micronesia than any other proposal 
considered by the ConCon, because it was meant to make final ratification of 
all the other proposed amendments considerably less difficult. Article XIV, 
Section 1 of the 1975 constitution requires that constitutional amendments be 
'approved by three-quarters of the votes cast in each of three-quarters of the 
states ' .  This proposal amended that figure to 'a  majority' vote in three quarters 
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of the states. As finally modified, the amendment also specified that this 
change would become effective on 3 November 1 990; given that the constitu­
tional referendum could not possibly have been held until some time in 1 99 1 ,  
this 1 990 date meant that the change would be retroactive, and the new 
ratification requirement would thus apply to the referendum itself. 
The proposal, submitted by Robert Ruecho' ,  chairman of the General 
Provisions Committee, two days before the ConCon's close, came in response 
to the sense, widely shared among the delegates, that gaining the approval of 
three quarters of the voters in three states would be nearly impossible, and that 
the Con Con was therefore a large! y futile effort. Several approaches to effecting 
a change were considered, including holding a special election to decide on this 
single item, but in the end it was decided that a place on the referendum ballot 
itself would be adequate for the task. 
As the Committee Report (Standing Commission Report 49, p.2) acknowl­
edged, 'concern was expressed that this proposal would make it easier for 
amendments to be approved by a minority of the total number of voters in the 
nation' .  When the plenary took up the i tern for consideration, it was pointed out 
that 5 1  per cent of the voters in three states might approve a measure while it 
received no votes in a fourth state, thus creating a situation in which the 
amendment would in fact be put into effect on the vote of an absolute minority. 
Indeed, if an item were approved by narrow margins in Kosrae, Pohnpei, and 
Yap and defeated overwhelmingly in Chuuk such a scenario might well be 
possible. Delegate Ruecho' responded that the present requirements for ratifi­
cation were almost impossible to satisfy. 'It would mean' ,  he argued, ' that 
having a ConCon every ten years is a waste of time' .  Two Kosraen delegates, 
in keeping with the position they had enunciated throughout the convention, that 
is, defending the sovereignty of the states, maintaining that none should be 
required to acquiesce in changes with which they disagreed, and calling instead 
for consensus (that is, unanimity), voted against the proposal. It passed 24-2, 
and thus raised the possibility that the ConCon's work might ultimately be 
sanctioned by the voters. Indeed, had 49 Kosraens cast their ballots differently 
for this one item, the outcome of the entire ConCon would have been far 
different from what it was. 
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The ratifying referendum 
The 24 proposed amendments approved by the ConCon, plus two added by 
the FSM Congress, were presented to voters in a constitutional referendum on 
2 July 1 991 . The FSM national government mounted an educational 
programme, in order to help voters understand the implications of the pro­
posed changes. This programme, unlike those which have preceded important 
referenda in the past, was decidely neutral in content. This is not surprising 
given the simple fact that, with few exceptions, the proposals had to have been 
relatively neutral in order to have made it through the ConCon. 
The most potent item on the ballot, as we have seen, was the final 
amendment to come out of the ConCon, lowering the ratification requirement 
from a three quarters majority to a simple majority in three states. This measure 
was approved in Yap and Pohnpei, but fell a few votes short of 75 per cent in 
Kosrae. As the delegates had foreseen, their work was nearly all for naught. 
Ultimately, only four amendments were approved by the voters . 
None of the proposals finally ratified had much to do with tensions among 
the states. Rather, all four were products of the ConCon's other key theme, the 
states ' shared antagonism toward the national government. The following 
changes were effected: 
( 1 )  Congress's  power to define 'major' crimes was limited to control over 
'national' crimes, that is, its charge is now defined by the nature of the 
crime, not its severity; 
(2) courts were required to use Micronesian precedents before turning to 
American law; 
(3) the prohibition against indefinite land-use agreements was limited to 
non-citizens and governments; 
(4) the national government' s role in education and health issues was 
redefined, so that it is no longer a concurrent power and its responsibilities 
in these areas are now enumerated. 
Voting patterns among the states varied widely, reflecting some of the same 
outlooks manifested at the ConCon. In Kosrae every proposed amendment was 
approved by at least 50 per cent of the voters, but only four items received 75 
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per cent or more approval. In Chuuk only two amendments were approved by 
50 percent of the voters (53 per cent and 54 per cent, respectively). In Pohnpei 
only four proposed amendments received less than 75 per cent approval (and 
one of these received 74 per cent) and in Yap only three proposals received less 
than 7 5 per cent of the votes. The Kosraen and Chuukese votes clearly reflected 
their delegates ' views that any change from the status quo could only hurt them. 
In particular, the Chuukese appear at first glance to have been overwhelmingly 
opposed to the proposed changes, and this would seem to indicate a shared sense 
that their numbers do give them a sizable advantage within the federation. For 
this reason, it is worth taking a closer look at the returns from Chuuk State, which 
in fact showed marked variation: some in Chuuk did indeed want change. 
In most of Congressional District 5 ,  the western and northern atolls, the 
amendments were approved by approximately 65 per cent to 80 per cent votes. 
Only one precinct, Nomwin, voted decisively against them, while Unanu and 
Onou approved some amendments and opposed others. In Congressional 
District 1, the southeastern atolls (known generally as the Mortlock Islands), the 
overall yes vote on individual items ranged from approximately 37 per cent to 
45 per cent, with the majority of the items receiving about 43 per cent approval. 
But there was enormous variation within this region, with six precincts approv­
ing most items and only five opposing them. Lukunor approved the proposals 
by an approximately 84 per cent vote, and five other precincts approved them 
by two-thirds to three-quarters votes. On Satawan, with a particularly large 
population, on the other hand, only 3 per cent of voters approved the proposals. 
Although more communities actually favoured than rejected the changes, 
Satawan's monolithic opposition carried the Mortlocks against the proposals. 
In Congressional District 3, the southeastern lagoon (southern Namoneas) 
including Tonowas, Param, and Uman, the vote tended to be close, with six 
items approved by 50 per cent votes. Six precincts gave most proposals outright 
approval and one, Penienuk Elin, approved the proposals with votes exceeding 
90 per cent. In three others, a minority of proposals was approved. In Congres­
sional District 2, which comprises the lagoon's main island Weno (Moen) and 
the rest of the northeast lagoon (northern N amoneas ), the proposals were 
defeated decisively, with yes votes ranging from approximately 23 per cent to 
38 per cent, and the average vote for approval around 34 per cent. In three 
precincts, however, all or nearly all the proposals were approved and in five 
others a minority of them was approved. 
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In Congressional District 4, the western lagoon (Faichuuk), the approval 
rate ranged from approximately 33 per cent to 39 per cent, with the average vote 
for approval around 38 per cent. In some of the precincts there, opposition to the 
proposals was overwhelming. In Neirenom the vote for nearly every item was 
0-1 1 1 , in Sopou it was 1-98, in Nethon 2-43 ;  in a number of others it averaged 
more than three-to-one against. On Romolum, on the other hand, the vote 
averaged approximately 80 per cent in favour of the proposals and in Monowe 
on Udot approval averaged nearly 90 per cent. 
We can see in this pattern of voting a phenomenon widespread in the FSM. 
In general, outlying atolls tend to favour harmony within the FSM and to shy 
away from controversial positions, believing that their position as minorities 
within their states is likely to be protected by a larger government under which 
nearly everyone is a minority. Thus Chuuk' s  atolls, with the notable exception 
of Satawan, largely agreed with the work of the ConCon and a significant 
majority of voters throughout the rest of the FSM. The southeast Lagoon 
opposed most of the proposals but did approve six. The two main actors in 
Chuuk State, Weno, the capital, and its staunch opponent, the Faichuk area in 
the western Lagoon, on the other hand, came out strongly against the proposed 
changes. 
Many in the FSM see Chuuk dominating Congress with its large numbers 
and consequent control of the speakership, which has been recently viewed as 
a more powerful office than the FSM presidency. Opposition to Congress, 
which lay at the core of so much ofthe ConCon's  work, was apparently read in 
Chuuk Lagoon, at least at some level, as opposition to Chuuk itself. And thus 
the Chuukese tended to favour the status quo, rather than the strict state equality 
formula pursued by Kosrae or the more general sense that the FSM needed to 
shift power away from the centre, that is, away from Chuuk's population 
numbers. 
Kosrae's  vote may be read as an opposite but nonetheless parallel trend. 
Given their small numbers, the Kosraens also saw themselves more likely to 
benefit from the status quo. They feared that in the absence of the significant 
changes they had pursued - intended to channel power through the states as a 
community of equals - any changes at all were liable to be threatening. A 
narrow majority of Kosraens supported most of the ConCon's proposals, 
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apparently agreeing with the Chuukese that if anyone benefitted from them it 
would be Kosrae rather than Chuuk. 
The tensions between Kosrae and Chuuk, which so defined the ConCon and 
lay at the root of its basic inability to implement any broad changes, extended 
to the referendum, where the two states' lackluster support or even outright 
opposition defeated nearly all the amendments the ConCon did manage to 
hammer out. The people of Yap and Pohnpei, like their delegates, were largely 
committed to stripping the central government of its power and to truly 
transforming the nation' s  character. Their support was not, however, sufficient 
to the task and in the end the referendum merely served to reaffirm the basic 
history of the ConCon itself: no one was especially happy with the character of 
the current FSM government, but there was entirely too much disagreement 
about which changes were necessary to reshape it. 
Conclusion 
The 1990 Federated States of Micronesia Constitutional Convention ended 
much as it began. In coming to the ConCon, the delegates brought with them 
the shared sense that 'We don't need two drivers anymore' .  Everyone was 
eager to see political, economic, and social responsibilities - and the funding 
to discharge them - transferred from the central government to the states. But 
tensions between Chuuk and Kosrae nearly paralyzed the entire convention. 
Each seemed convinced that a change would work against them. The 
Kosraens feared that Chuuk's  large population would effectively take over the 
federation and relegate Kosrae to an entirely marginal position. The Chuukese 
believed that a principle conferring upon 7 ,OOO Kosraens the same political 
weight as Chuuk's 55,000 people was fundamentally unjust. No resolution of 
this dilemma, nor any sort of compromise, was achieved. 
The ConCon served only (or at least primarily) to further heighten the 
tensions within the FSM, both between the states and their federal government 
and among the states themselves. In time, I believe, unhappiness with the central 
government, which has been growing steadily since its inception, will result in 
a concerted effort, quite possibly accompanied by some violence, to wrest 
power from it. When this happens, however, relations among the states them-
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selves will have so deteriorated that no new accommodation among them will 
be found. 
When the current Compact of Free Association with the United States 
expires in 2001 , then, the FSM will dissolve and a series of microstates, even 
smaller than than the FSM's 100,000 plus population, will emerge. But each of 
these (with the exception of Kosrae) will in turn include ethnic minorities who 
have been protected by the FSM's necessary commitment to heterogeneity. In 
Yap and Chuuk, there are old cultural patterns of comity and cooperation among 
the islands. For millennia these were underpinned by the exigencies of island 
living in the typhoon spawning belt. On Pohnpei such traditional ties have never 
really existed. But today security derives not from traditionally-sanctioned 
patterns of mutual aid and respect, but rather from ties of dependency upon the 
United States, the United Nations, and a few of the larger Pacific Rim powers. 
Across the region, each of the dominant peoples within these newer polities will 
be inclined see their own minority populations as competitors for foreign aid 
funds and for the limited resources remaining on the larger islands. Given 
regnant attitudes, these high island peoples may well encourage the atoll peoples 
to go their own ways, as well. 
It is thus not at all unlikely that the early twenty-first century will see the 
formation of a series of Tuvalu- and Tokelau-, or even Niue-sized political 
entities forming in Micronesia. All of Micronesia will look like Kiribati, Belau, 
and the Marshalls. Since this is a pattern that may well also develop in Africa, 
among some of the old Soviet republics, and - if Burma is any guide - in 
Southeast Asia, it may not seem quite so strange in a decade or so as it does now. 
Such fissioning goes quite against the grain of twentieth-century political 
thought, conditioned as it has been by sheer size of a handful of superpowers and 
superstates. But changes in technology may make it possible for statelets to 
coexist with giants, even if the quest for power does not make it likely. Tue 
historical trajectory of colonialism, which once strung these islands together 
like so many gems on an empress's  necklace, has passed its apogee; the golden 
chain has snapped and the stones scatter. 
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Notes 
Throughout this essay I shall use the term 'Micronesian' in its most restrictive 
sense, that is, with reference to the peoples of the Federated States of Micronesia. 
Other Micronesians are now generally known by more localized terms, such as 
B elauans, I-Kiribati, etc. 
2 The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, formerly part of the Trust Territory, 
has a dominant Chamorro majority and a minority population of Central Carolinian 
descent, as well as a relatively large number (approximately 50 per cent of the total 
population) of immigrant labourers, much like Nauru, with its 'guest-workers' ,  
who mine the phosphates. 
3 Some Micronesians, however, maintain that there is mythohistorical precedent for 
modern political linkages among Kosrae, Pohnpei, Chuuk, Yap and the islands 
lying between them. 
4 I am not suggesting anything remotely like stasis; these island societies and 
cultures have undergone major changes during this time, and have influenced each 
other in the process. But on the larger islands, at least, there is little or no indication 
of large-scale displacements or hostile occupations until the arrival of the Europe­
ans and the diseases they brought with them; continuity seems more significant 
than discontinuity. The atolls, on the other hand, have always been more vulner­
able to the mass destruction of typhoons and prolonged droughts, and most of them 
have probably been abandoned and resettled repeatedly. 
5 The character of political relations within Yap proper (i.e., the island of Yap), 
however, must be contrasted with the traditional dominance of a part of Yap over 
the atolls to the east. 
6 The ConCon's official Journal has never appeared; preliminary transcripts of some 
plenary meetings were circulated. Official records of committee meetings exist 
only in summary minutes and standing commmittee reports, which rarely recount 
the give and take of discussion and debate . 
7 In the course of a debate concerning traditional rights over submerged reefs, one 
delegate was moved to exclaim, 'Those reefs didn't just fall down from the sky. 
They were there before 1975, so someone must have rights over them! ' .  His was an 
attempt to remind FSM bureaucrats (and others) that the states consider themselves 
to have existed prior to the establishment of the FSM and that their claims to 
rightfully control resources are based on this interpretation of history. 
8 Indeed, even continued Trust Territory status garnered more votes than Free 
Association. The totals for Yap, Chuuk, Kosrae, and Pohnpei were: 'Indepen-
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dence' 6,822, continued 'Trust Territory' status 5,288, 'Free Association' 5,004 
(Petersen 1979:484). 
9 A full-scale study of the 1990 ConCon would have to explore in depth the 
connections between the conventions. In the present context I can do no more than 
refer the interested reader to Norman Meller's Constitutionalism in Micronesia 
( 1 985), which covers in detail nearly every aspect of the 1975 Convention. 
10 The US had hesitated to bring the termination question before the Security Coun­
cil, which oversaw the Micronesian Trusteeship. There was considerable 
likelihood that the USSR would exercise its veto, and level charges that American 
militarization of the area was in violation of the basic Trusteeship principle. In 
December 1990, days after the US had agreed to supply the USSR with nearly two 
billion dollars in food credits, the Security Council was asked to terminate the 
Trust Agreements for the Northern Marianas, the FSM, and the Marshalls, which it 
did with the Soviet Union's approval. 
1 1  Pohnpei' s Bethwel Henry (who had served for many years in the Congress of 
Micronesia and the FSM Congress) introduced a minor modification to the qualifi­
cations for service in Congress (Del. Prop. 70) . 
12 Few Micronesians make permanent moves anywhere other than to seats of govern­
ment, that is, state and national capitals. Thus most interstate migration is to 
Pohnpei. 
1 3 In US jurisprudence, parties interested in a particular outcome of a judicial 
proceeding may submit commentaries as 'friends of the court', known as 
amicus curiae. 
14 The Congressional Journal ( 4 December 1989) reports that in public hearings held 
in Yap and Pohnpei, consensus was also supported. 
15 Several observers thought the margin was closer; even division votes do not 
necessarily provide a clear-cut count when a show of hands is accompanied by the 
reticence that tends to characterize Micronesian public political performance. 
1 6 To form three-judge appellate panels the FSM Supreme Court names judges from 
the state supreme courts. 
17 This was one of the few references to Meller' s enormous contributions to 
Micronesian constitutionalism and its history that I encountered at the ConCon, 
and it was to a briefing paper from before the ConCon, not to his record of the 
Convention itself. The delegates' generally ahistorical approach to the ConCon 
both impells my attempt to record it and inclines me to think that this record will 
receive scant attention. 
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18 One Yapese delegate, demonstrating his genuine commitment to representative 
government, ack."llowledged - after the defeat in committee of several proposals 
he had been advocating - that he had personally opposed them. 
19 In this it stands in marked contrast to arguments in American constitutional law 
which focus on the Preamble's opening phrase, 'We the people'.  Indeed, one of the 
objections initially levelled at the constitution was that it drew its impetus from the 
people rather than the states. 
20 Indeed, only one proposal even lends itself to interpretation as a call for greater 
national government powers, Delegate Proposal 68, which specified that promo­
tion of health care, education, and legal services should be priorities of the national 
government. However, the intent of this proposal was both to remove health and 
education from the powers held concurrently by the national government and to 
overcome the FSM Congress's perceived failure to provide adequate funding in 
these areas, and it was thus one more implicit criticism of the national government. 
21 Pohnpei' s  at-large senator, Bailey Olter, of outer-islands origins, had served as 
vice president under President Nakayama and it was widely believed that he would 
succeed to the presidency. Because Pohnpeians assumed that it was their state's 
tum to occupy this high office, however, the election for their at-large seat was 
hotly contested, and an ethnic Pohnpeian, Leo Falcam (who had never served in 
Congress) won. It was in this context that Congress decided not to name Pohnpei's  
senator as  president. 
· 
22 The Compact specifies that this be done in consultation with the FSM national 
government, but does not require the FSM's approval. 
23 Dealings with the European Community were explicitly cited as being complicated 
by the ambiguities of the FSM' s political status. 
24 Opposition to alterations in the original constitution's language was first posed in 
the plenary by former president Nakayama, who asked that certain phrases in it, 
though no longer pertinent, be allowed to remain for historical (and partly nostal­
gic) reasons. 
25 It should be noted in this context that the Pohnpeians' interest in secession has been 
both consistent and in keeping with their feelings about the FSM and free associa­
tion in general. It is by no means a tactical threat. 
26 'The term "Woleai" includes all of the related islands to the east of Ulithi, except 
for Fais' (Lingenfelter 1975 : 150). 
27 Kapingamarangi is one of the outlying Polynesian atolls, and its customs have very 
different historical roots from those of the 'Micronesian' islands. 
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28 One of the delegates had with him a pamphlet produced by the Trust Territory's  
'Education for Self-Government' programme following the 1 975 Constitutional 
Convention, entitled 'A Glossary of Words and Terms used in the Constitution' .  In 
it, 'custom' is defined as 'Some practice which has existed for a long time and is 
accepted by a community or a group as being proper although it is not a written 
law' .  'Tradition' does not appear in it. The only time I heard reference made to this 
pamphlet was during this discussion of custom versus tradition. 
29 Not all the expatriate advisers opposed this amendment. Indeed, one was an 
articulate advocate of it. 
30 This episode in some ways hearkens back to a scene encountered at the original 
constitutional convention, when an initial attempt to introduce several articles 
protecting civil liberties-specifically freedom of the press and speech - met with 
strong resistance by some of the ' traditional leaders' who served as delegates. 
These men argued, rather cogently, that in their societies kin and community 
groups had both the right and the responsibility to seek redress when offended. 
They were troubled by what such guarantees for potentially offending acts or 
speech might do to those traditional rights. Although several clauses protecting 
customary rights were written into the constitution, and reaffirmed by the 1 990 
ConCon, the American chief justice of the FSM Supreme Court in fact explicitly 
denied the right of kin and community groups to engage in certain actions 
grounded in these rights and responsibilities (FSM v. Mudong and FSM v. Ben­
jamin, FSM v. Ruben).  
3 1  The Yapese did not re-elect this at-large senator in 1 991  and he was precluded 
from a second term as president. At the same time, the Pohnpeians elected Bailey 
Olter, who had been FSM vice-president under President Nakayama, and Congress 
chose him as president. 
32 Expatriate workers with work permits approved by one state are generally free to 
travel to and work in other states. 
33 On Yap, land can only be transferred through traditional means and this issue was 
not of particular concern to the Yapese delegation . Although land was not a crucial 
subject for Kosrae either-few outsiders reside there and the island' s population 
was so decimated by disease in the nineteenth century that it is still relatively 
underpopulated-large numbers of Kosraens live on Pohnpei and access to land 
there is an issue for them. 
34 In other hearings, it became clear that no one was certain about the current right of 
aliens with work permits to travel and work in other states. 'Could Yap' ,  one legal 
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staffer asked, 'kick the FSM Attorney General [an American] out?' . No one 
seemed to know. 
35 In this matter, the Yapese position was similar to Pohnpei's :  the national govern­
ment in Micronesia is not a traditional category and thus does not represent 
traditional values or practices. In being 'Micronesian' it is neither Yapese, 
Chuukese, Pohnpeian, nor Kosraen. 
36 While Yap's and Pohnpei's chiefly systems also entail ceaseless status competi­
tion, it is usually possible to find some agreement on which titles are currently 
ascendant. This is one of the marked differences between Chuuk on the one hand 
and Yap and Pohnpei on the other. 
37 Requests to recall a defeated proposal had to come from someone who had voted 
against it. 
38 As explained in note 9, I have deliberately avoided comparing the 1 990 ConCon 
with the original constitutional convention. In the case of the Chamber of Chiefs 
proposal, however, the delegates themselves made continual reference to the at­
tempts in 1 975 to grapple with issues of custom and tradition, and much of their 
debate can only be understood in the context of questions left open by the ambigu­
ous outcome of the 1 975 Convention - that is, the clause that allowed for but did 
not require establishment of a Chamber of Chiefs. 
39 The Net Nahniken was born after his father had already become Nahnmwarki. This 
conferred upon him lpwen warawar ( 'Born over the ditch') status and made him, 
in strictly spiritual terms, the highest-ranking person on the island. By the stan­
dards of traditional Pohnpeian culture, he was indeed 'born to rule' . 
40 While the ConCon was in session, access to the Chamber floor was strictly limited 
to delegates and official staff. This episode was the only occasion on which I saw 
anyone else enter onto the floor. 
4 1 This was the only delegate speech made from a podium. Acting in his capacity as 
' talking chief, the Nahniken was assuming the normal chiefly position: raised up 
above everyone else present. 
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